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NEBRASKA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR
AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISING INFIRMITIES
BY EXERTION OR STRAIN
John M. Gradwohl*
The recent United States National Health Survey indicates
that almost one out of six workers has some sort of known
chronic or permanent physical impairment.' On any given work
day, an undetermined number of additional workers would have
various sorts of lesser physical infirmities ranging from minor
ailments, such as small cuts or common colds, to really serious
physical limitations. Many more workers would have undetected
and unknown physical infirmities. This article will examine the
extent to which these workers may be entitled to compensation
under the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Law for work-
connected aggravation of their pre-existing infirmities by exer-
tion or strain.
I. GENERAL COMPENSATION RULES CONCERNING
AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING INFIRMITIES
The workmen's compensation statute, if applicable to the
parties, covers "every case of injury or death caused by accident
or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment."2  "Injury" is defined to mean "only violence to the
physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as
naturally results therefrom. ' 3 The term "accident" is to "be
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I U.S. PUBLIc HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATIOi, AND WEL-
FARE, BULL. No. 9, HEALTH STATISTIc: INFIRITIEs 11 (Series B 1959).
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960).
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(4) (Reissue 1960). The section specifically
excludes from coverage "disability or death due to natural causes
but occurring while the employee is at work."
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construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening
suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and pro-
ducing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.
'4
The definition of "injury" contains langauge that it "shall
include an aggravation of a preexisting occupational disease, the
employer being liable only for the degree of aggravation of the
preexisting occupational disease." 5  "Occupational disease" is an
extremely limited term meaning "only a disease which is due to
causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar
to a particular trade, occupation, process or employment and
shall exclude all ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public are exposed."6 There is no specific statutory reference to
the problems of aggravation of any other sort of pre-existing
infirmity.
7
By case law, it has become well settled that where an injury
combines with a pre-existing disease8 or other physical infirmity 9
4 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1960).
5 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151(4) (Reissue 1960).
6 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3) (Reissue 1960).
7 Where an employee refuses or neglects to avail himself of medical
or surgical treatment furnished by the employer, the statute states
that "the employer shall not be liable for an aggravation of such
injury due to such refusal and neglect." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120
(Reissue 1960). For the effect of the second injury fund, see note
13 infra.
8 Tilghman v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.2d 739 (1960); Gourley v.
City of Grand Island, 168 Neb. 538, 96 N.W.2d 309 (1959); Sporcic
v. Swift & Co., 149 Neb. 246, 30 N.W.2d 891 (1948); Dryden v. Omaha
Steel Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293 (1947); Faulhaber v. Roberts
Dairy Co., 147 Neb. 631, 24 N.W.2d 571 (1946); Schwabauer v. State,
147 Neb. 620, 24 N.W.2d 431 (1946); Yakal v. Henkle & Joyce Hard-
ware Co., 145 Neb. 365, 16 N.W.2d 531 (1944); Palmer v. Sample,
141 Neb. 36, 2 N.W.2d 583 (1942); Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers
Tel. Co., 139 Neb. 182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941); City of Omaha v. Casau-
bon, 138 Neb. 608, 294 N.W. 389 (1940); Chatt v. Massman Constr.
Co., 138 Neb. 288, 293 N.W. 105 (1940); Maul v. Iowa-Nebraska Light
& Power Co., 137 Neb. 128, 288 N.W. 532 (1939); Miller v. Central
Coal & Coke Co., 123 Neb. 793, 244 N.W. 401 (1932); Watkins v.
Brunswick Restaurant Co., 123 Neb. 212, 242 N.W. 439 (1932); Skelly
Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930); Ne-
braska Nat'l Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924);
Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N.W. 578 (1922).
9 Plambeck v. Natkin & Co., 171 Neb. 774, 107 N.W.2d 734 (1961);
Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958);
Knudsen v. McNeely, 159 Neb. 227, 66 N.W.2d 412 (1954); Tucker
v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 43 N.W.2d 522 (1950); Dy-
mak v. Haskins Bros., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937); Marler v.
Grainger Bros., 123 Neb. 517, 243 N.W. 622 (1932); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121, 227 N.W. 449 (1929).
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to produce disability, the employee is entitled to compensation.' 0
This is true whether the injury causes a resulting disability which
is itself more severe than it would have been had there been no
pre-existing infirmity, or whether the injury merely accelerates
or aggravates the pre-existing impairment to a state of disability
which is not the result of a natural progression of the impair-
ment.'. There is no requirement that the accident be one which
would have produced disability by itself were it not for the
presence of the pre-existing infirmity.1 2  Where an employee
sustains a compensable aggravation of a pre-existing impairment,
he normally is entitled to workmen's compensation disability
benefits based upon his resulting condition without reduction
10 Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Century of Judicial De-
velopments, 41 NEB. L. REv. 1, 10 (1961).
11 Plambeck v. Natkin & Co., 171 Neb. 774, 107 N.W.2d 734 (1961);
Tilghman v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.2d 739 (1960); Gourley v.
City of Grand Island, 168 Neb. 538, 96 N.W.2d 309 (1959); Pittenger
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958); Turner
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 165 Neb. 338, 85 N.W.2d 721 (1957); Tucker
v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 43 N.W.2d 522 (1950); Sporcic
v. Swift & Co., 149 Neb. 246, 30 N.W.2d 891 (1948); Dryden v. Omaha
Steel Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293 (1947); Schwabauer v. State,
147 Neb. 620, 24 N.W.2d 431 (1946); Yakal v. Henkle & Joyce Hard-
ware Co., 145 Neb. 365, 16 N.W.2d 531 (1944); Palmer v. Sample,
141 Neb. 36, 2 N.W.2d 583 (1942); Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers
Tel. Co., 139 Neb. 182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941); City of Omaha v.
Casaubon, 138 Neb. 608, 294 N.W. 389 (1940); Chatt v. Massman
Constr. Co., 138 Neb. 288, 293 N.W. 105 (1940); Maul v. Iowa-
Nebraska Light & Power Co., 137 Neb. 128, 288 N.W. 532 (1939);
Dymak v. Haskins Bros., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937); Miller
v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 123 Neb. 793, 244 N.W. 401 (1932);
Marler v. Grainger Bros., 123 Neb. 517, 243 N.W. 622 (1932); Wat-
kins v. Brunswick Restaurant Co., 123 Neb. 212, 242 N.W. 439 (1932);
Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121, 227 N.W. 449 (1929); Ne-
braska Nat'l Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924);
Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N.W. 578 (1922).
12 Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958);
Tucker v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 43 N.W.2d 522 (1950);
Yakal v. Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co., 145 Neb. 365, 16 N.W.2d
531 (1944); Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers Tel. Co., 139 Neb.
182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941); Chatt v. Massman Constr. Co., 138 Neb.
288, 293 N.W. 105 (1940); Dymak v. Haskins Bros., 132 Neb. 308,
271 N.W. 860 (1937); Miller v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 123 Neb.
793, 244 N.W. 401 (1932); Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb.
698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121,
227 N.W. 449 (1929); Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246,
190 N.W. 578 (1922).
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for the contributing factor of the pre-existing infirmity.13 The
unsettled legal issues concerning recovery for aggravation of pre-
existing infirmities lie primarily in the area of determining fac-
tually whether there has been aggravation "by accident" within
the meaning of the statute.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACCIDENT REQUIREMENT
The accident requirement in American compensation statutes
was patterned after the English Workmen's Compensation Act
of 189714 which covered "personal injury by accident arising out
13 See notes 8 and 9 supra. Under the second injury fund provision,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-128 (Reissue 1960), an employee with a "pre-
vious disability other than one caused by disease" who suffers a
permanent total disability is entitled to benefits based upon his
total resulting condition. See Franzen v. Blakley, 155 Neb. 621, 52
N.W.2d 833 (1952). The Nebraska Supreme Court hds not yet ruled
on the amount of compensation payable to an employee with a pre-
vious disability who suffers additional work connected disability,
but whose resulting condition is less than total permanent disability.
From a literal reading of the compensation statute, there would
seem to be no reason why these employees, like all employees gen-
erally, are not entitled to compensation benefits based upon their total
resulting condition without reduction for the factor of the previous
disability. In practice, however, the compensation court reasons
that the employer is responsible only for the disability caused by
the employment. The compensation court deducts from a subse-
quent award the amount of any previous disability existing at the
time of the accident. The formula appears to be based upon total
resulting condition less pre-existing disability. This amount could
be significantly different than the amount charged to the employer
if the second injury fund statute were applied. Under that statute,
"the employer shall be liable only for the partial disability which
would have resulted from the second injury in the absence of any
pre-existing disability." The present position of the compensation
court appears to be quite similar to the apportionment statute which
was a part of the Nebraska statutes from 1913 to 1947, but which
would seem to have been repealed by the 1947 amendment estab-
lishing the second injury fund. See notes 53-55 infra. In any
event, both the compensation court and the supreme court interpret
the term "previous disability" to mean only an inability to perform
the duties of the employment on a day to day basis, or a sub-
stantial physical loss of a body function. See note 56 infra. An
employee with an infirmity which would have been, or was, a com-
pensable disability under the statute does not necessarily have a
"previous disability" at the time of a subsequent injury, if (1) the
disability has been cured at the time of the subsequent injury, or
(2) the disability did not interfere with the employee's performance
of his duties or constitute a substantial physical loss of a body
function.
14 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37, § 1(1) (repealed). This language was repeated
in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 1(1)
(repealed).
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of and in the course of the employment." No definition of "by
accident" appeared in the statute but it was generally thought
to involve something which was at least "unexpected" or "un-
foreseen." Immediately, however, the term caused a sharp dis-
agreement about the basic coverage of the compensation statute.
A literal reading could lead to the conclusion that the statute
required either (a) that the "cause" of the personal injury must
be "by accident," or (b) that only the resulting personal injury,
itself, apart from its "cause," need be "by accident." An answer
to the question whether it was the "cause" of injury which must
be unexpected or the "result" could make a difference in the
outcome of a significant number of cases under the compensa-
tion system. Where the routine exertion of normal work of an
employee had caused a break-down in his internal body, there
might have been no accidental cause of the injury, and yet the
injury, alone, might be accidental in the sense of being unex-
pected and unforeseen.
In Hensey v. White,15 a cabinet maker died of a ruptured
blood vessel in his stomach caused by strain while he was at-
tempting to start a gas engine which was stiff from disuse during
the Christmas holidays. The Court of Appeals in 1900 denied
recovery since this was a part of the employee's normal duties
and did not involve a "fortuitous element."
Three years later, in Fenton v. Thorley & Co.,'0 the House
of Lords overruled Hensey v. White in a decision which has been
followed during succeeding years.17 A machinist was ruptured
in attempting to move a stuck wheel on his machine. The em-
ployee was doing his ordinary work in an ordinary way; there
was no slip, wrench or sudden jerk.' In allowing recovery on
the basis that the unexpected rupture constituted "personal in-
jury by accident," the opinion of Lord Macnaghten, after analyz-
15 [1900] 1 Q.B. 481. There was evidence that the strain accelerated
the previous physical infirmity. In a companion case, the court
denied recovery to an employee who aggravated a blistered finger
by working with red lead and oil because he was at the time work-
ing in the ordinary way and with the usual materials and appliances.
Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., [1900] 1 Q.B. 488.
16 [1903] A.C. 443.
17 This line of decisions has continued to be followed under the present
national industrial injuries provisions which cover "personal injury
caused ... by accident arising out of and in the course of such
employment." See 16 Halsbury Stat. (Eng.) 801-02 (2d ed. 1950).
18 Opinion of Lord Macnaghten, Fenton v. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C.
443, 445: "Fenton was a man of ordinary health and strength.
There was no evidence of any slip, or wrench, or sudden jerk. It
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1961
ing the langauge of the statute, stated: 19 "I come, therefore, to
the conclusion that the expression 'accident' is used in the popular
and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for mis-
hap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed."
Lord Robertson added:
20
No one out of a Law Court would ever hesitate to say that this
man met with an accident, and, when all is said, I think this
use of the word perfectly right .... In the present instance the
man by an act of over-exertion broke the wall of his abdomen.
S.. [Suppose the wheel had yielded and been broken by ex-
actly the same act, surely the breakage would be rightly de-
scribed as accidental. Yet the argument against the application
of the Act is in this case exactly the same-that there is nothing
accidental in the matter, as the man did what he intended to do.
The fallacy of the argument lies in leaving out of account the
miscalculation of forces, or inadvertence to them, which is the
element or mischance, mishap, or misadventure.
The House of Lords re-examined and reaffirmed this interpreta-
tion in Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes21 in 1910. At the time
may be taken that the injury occurred while the man was engaged
in his ordinary work, and in doing or trying to do the very thing
which he meant to accomplish."
19 Id. at 448. Lord Shand said: "But I agree with my noble and
learned friend [Lord Macnaghten] in thinking that the words 'per-
sonal injury by accident' and 'accident' are used in the statute in
the popular and ordinary sense of these words .... I shall only
add that, concurring as I fully do in holding that the word 'acci-
dent' in the statute is to be taken in its popular and ordinary
sense, I think that it denotes or includes any unexpected personal
injury resulting to the workman in the course of his employment
from any unlooked-for mishap or occurrence." Id. at 451. Lord
Lindley concurred in the result of the decision, but would have
rested the decision on the ground that the rupture constituted a
personal injury and the accident which caused it was the unin-
tended and unexpected resistance of the stuck wheel to the force
which was applied to it. Id. at 455.
20 Id. at 452.
21 [1910] A.C. 242 (3-2 decision). Compensation was awarded for the
death of a workman from the rupture of an aneurism brought on
by the tightening of a nut with a spanner, the strain being quite
ordinary in his ordinary work. The aneurism was so advanced that
it might have burst at any time. The two dissenting Lords, while
formally rejecting an ordinary exertion test, did not urge that the
basic definition of Fenton v. Thorley be overruled. For example,
Lord Atkinson, dissenting, stated: "I think the meaning put upon
the word 'accident' in Fenton v. Thorley must now be accepted in
all cases turning on the construction of the phrase 'injury by acci-
dent' used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, as its true
meaning, namely, 'an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event
which is not expected or designed.'" Id. at 250. The basis for
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the American definitions were borrowed from it, the English law
had become settled that "by accident" included all unexpected
work-connected injuries, whether or not the precise cause was
unexpected. 22  Specifically, it was clear that an employee was
entitled to compensation for injuries resulting from exertion or
strain in performing his ordinary duties.
Seven states, California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan,23
Minnesota, 24 Rhode Island, and Texas 25 and the Federal Em-
Lord Atkinson's dissent appears to be primarily the matter of factual
causation. Lord Shaw, dissenting, argued for a narrower application
of Lord Macnaghten's definition as requiring some unusual or ab-
normal strain.
22 See 1 LARSON, WomiuVrE's COVPENSATION LAW § 38.10 (1952); Boh-
len, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts,
25 HARv. L. REv. 328, 340 (1912).
23 Mottonen v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 360 -Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d 33
(1960). For an exceedingly interesting account of the struggle which
the Michigan Supreme Court went through to hold that "accident"
was no longer required, see Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83
N.W.2d 603 (1957); Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577,
83 N.W.2d 614 (1957); Wieda v. American Box Bd. Co., 343 Mich.
182, 72 N.W.2d 13 (1955).
24 The Minnesota accident requirement, which had been virtually iden-
tical to that of Nebraska, was deleted in 1953 as a result of the
Report of the Interim Commission on Workmen's Compensation to
Revise and Codify the Laws of Minnesota Relating to Workmen's
Compensation 57 (1953): "The use of the phrase 'by accident' is
nothing but the remnant of bygone days when occupational diseases
were outside the purview of the Act. Today the course of the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of this state and other jurisdictions
shows that the clause 'by accident' has lost any practical signifi-
cance and that the words in question have at best a nuisance value.
"The elimination of the words 'caused by accident' and their
definition from the statute would not markedly broaden the scope
of the statutory protection but merely help to rid the law of mean-
ingless and confusing restrictions. Other states have long taken
this course .... The Commission is convinced that compensable
harm is sufficiently identified and delimited by the terms 'personal
injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, includ-
ing personal injury caused by occupational disease' as defined by
the Act." See Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d
200 (1960) (compensation allowed to seventeen-year sales lady in a
ladies' ready to wear store for a deteriorative disorder of the big
toe resulting in stiffness from standing and walking most of the
time at work).
25 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (1956) (injury means "dam-
age or harm to the physical structure of the body"); Texas Employ-
ers' Ins. Ass'n v. Agan, 252 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). Some Texas cases specifically involving exertion, however,
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ployees Compensation Act have eliminated the accident require-
ment. The other forty-three states have retained various forms
of a requirement of accident.
26
seem to proceed on a basis of accidental injury. See Gorman v.
American Gen. Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Trad-
ers & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rooth, 268 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
26 Twenty-nine states, including Nebraska, still require that the injury
be "by accident" or "by an accident." ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 253
(1958); ALASKA COmP. LAWS ANN. § 43-3-41(9) (Supp. 1959); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1021A (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-2
(3) (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 440.02
(6) (1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (1956); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 97-3 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201 (1949); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 40-1202 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1949); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 342.005 (Supp. 1960); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031 (1951);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 31, § 8 (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(1)
(1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 616.270(1) (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59-10-6(c) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(6), -3
(1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8) (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, §§ 411, 431 (1952); S.C. CODE §§ 72-14, -101 (1952); S.D. CODE
§ 64-0105 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-902(d), -903 (1955); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953); VT. STAT. tit. 21, § 618 (1959); VA. CODE
ANN. § 65-7 (1950); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2) (1957 and Supp.
1961). Eight states require "accidental injury" or "accidental per-
sonal injury." ARK. STAT. § 81-1302(d) (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-139 (1960); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 48, §§ 138.7, .8 (1959); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 6998-02(02), -04
(Supp. 958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:2(111) (Supp. 1959);
N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 2(7); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (Supp.
1959). It was suggested in an article by Professor Bohlen that a
change from the phrase "by accident" to "accidental injury" would
operate to allow recovery for injuries which develop over an ex-
tended period of time. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 338-46 (1912). But
this distinction has not been adopted in most of the states requiring
"accidental injury." Six states do not fall clearly into either of the
above categories but nevertheless require accident in one form or
another. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 92-418 (Supp. 1961) (injury
means "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unex-
pected cause, resulting in either external or internal physical harm
.... "); Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094
(1958); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (Page Supp. 1960) (injury
includes "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means
or accidental in character or result .... "); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
656.002(19), .152 Supp. 1959) ("injury is accidental if the result is
an accident, whether or not due to accidental means"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 51.08.100 (Supp. 1957) (injury means "a sudden and tangible
happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt
result, and occurring from without."); W. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 4,
§ 1 (1955) (compensation is provided for employees who "shall have
received personal injuries in the course of and resulting from their
employment .... "); Gilbert v. State Compensation Comm'r, 121
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Following the pattern of the English act, most states do not
have a statutory definition of "accident." Alabama, Louisiana,
Missouri, and Nevada have statutory definitions like that of Ne-
braska.27  All seven state statutes defining "accident" have some
sort of a requirement of "unexpected or unforeseen event,' '2s
which would seem to be merely a codification of the previous
judicial definition discussed above.
29
W. Va. 10, 1 S.E.2d 167 (1939); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-49, -50, -78,
-104 (1957) (The act requires compensation for "persons injured."
Injury is not defined. A requirement that an accident report be
filed seems to infer that accident is required.); Wright v. Wyoming
State Training School, 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211 (1953); In re Pero,
49 Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690 (1935).
27 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1960) states: "The word acci-
dent as used in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly
indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or
unforseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without
human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury." See Mo. AN. STAT. § 287.020(2) (Supp. 1960); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 616.020 (Supp. 1959). In ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262(i) (1958),
the relevant terms are identical except that in place of "objective
symptoms" it requires "injury to the physical structure of the body."
The relevant wording of LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1021 (1951) is like Ne-
braska's statute except that in place of "suddenly and violently"
it requires only "suddenly or violently." Minnesota originally had
a similar statute, but has since eliminated the entire accident re-
quirement. Minn. Laws c. 467, § 34(h), p. 693 (1913).
28 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262(i) (1958); FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (19) (1959);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1021(1)
(1951); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020(2) (Supp. 1960); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-151(2) (Reissue 1960); NEv. REV. STAT. § 616.020 (Supp. 1959).
29 For this language, see notes 19 to 21 supra and accompanying text.
In Fenton v. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443, 446-48, Lord Macnaghten
reasoned as follows: "[T]he learned judges of the Court of Appeal
held in Hensey v. White [1900] 1 Q.B. 481, as they have held here,
that there was no accident, because (to quote the leading judgment)
there was 'an entire lack of the fortuitous element.' What the man
'was doing,' it was said, 'he was doing deliberately, and in the
ordinary course of his work, and that which happened was in no
sense a fortuitous event.' To the expression as used by Lord Hals-
bury in the passage in which it occurs no possible objection can be
taken; but it is, I think, to be regretted that the word fortuitous
should have been applied to the term injury by accident in the
Workmen's Compensation Act. If it means exactly the same thing
as accidental the use of the word is superfluous. If it introduces
the element of haphazard (if I may use the expression), an element
which is not necessarily involved in the word 'accidental,' its use,
I venture to think, is misleading, and not warranted by anything
in the Act.... If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to move
something not easily moved, were to strain a muscle, or rick his
back, or rupture himself, the mishap in ordinary parlance would be
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Nebraska and seven other states require "happening sudden-
described as an accident. Anybody would say that the man had
met with an accident in lifting a weight, or trying to move some-
thing too heavy for him.... A man injures himself by doing
some stupid thing, and it is called an accident and he gets the
benefit of the insurance. It may even be his own fault, and yet
compensation is not to be disallowed unless the injury is attrib-
utable to 'serious and wilful misconduct' on his part. A man in-
jures himself suddenly and unexpectedly by throwing all his might
and all his strength and all his energy into his work by doing his
very best and utmost for his employer, not sparing himself or tak-
ing thought of what may come upon him, and then he is to be
told that his case is outside the Act because he exerted himself de-
liberately, and there was an entire lack of the fortuitous element!
I cannot think that that is right .... I come, therefore, to the con-
clusion that the expression 'accident' is used in the popular and
ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or
an untoward event which is not expected or designed." Lord Lind-
ley stated: "Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabil-
ities, an accident means any unintended and unexpected occurrence
which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote any
unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause, and
if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself would certainly be
called an accident. The word accident is also often used to denote
both the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to discrim-
inate between them. The great majority of what are called acci-
dents are occasioned by carelessness, but for legal purposes it is
often important to distinguish careless from other unintended and
unexpected events. In this Act of Parliament the word is used in
a very loose way." Id. at 453. In Clover, Clayton, & Co. v. Hughes,
[1910] A.C. 242, 245-46, Lord Loreburn stated: "The first question
here is whether or not the learned judge was entitled to regard the
rupture as an 'accident' within the meaning of this Act. In my
opinion he was to entitled. Certainly it was an 'untoward event.'
It was not designed. It was unexpected in what seems to me the
relevant sense, namely, that a sensible man who knew the nature
of the work would not have expected it .... No doubt the ordinary
accident is associated with something external; the bursting of a
boiler, or an explosion in a mine, for example. But it may be
merely from the man's own miscalculation, such as tripping and
falling. Or it may be due to both internal and external conditions,
as if a seaman were to faint in the rigging and tumble into the sea.
I think that it may also be something going wrong within the human
frame itself, such as the straining of a muscle, or the breaking of
a blood vessel. If that occurred when he was lifting a weight it
would be properly described as an accident. So, I think, rupturing
an aneurism, when tightening a nut with a spanner, may be re-
garded as an accident." Lord Macnaughten stated: "The fact that
the result would have been expected, or, indeed, contemplated as
a certainty, by a medical man of ordinary skill if he had diagnosed
the case is, I think, nothing to the purpose. An occurrence I think
is unexpected if it is not expected by the man who suffers by it,
even though every man of common sense who knew the circum-
stances would think it certain to happen." Id. at 250.
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ly." °30 Five statutes require physical violence as an essential ele-
ment of recovery.31 This could involve a significant change from
the English definition, under which recovery was given to a
worker sorting bales of wool when a bacillus of anthrax alighted
in his eye killing him.32 The House of Lords felt that there was
no difference between the bacillus landing on the eye and a spark
from an anvil, but perhaps the statutory requirement of violence
would change this rule.
Four statutes require "objective symptoms" (although not
necessarily "at the time") . 3  Three statutes require that the
cause of harm be external to the body,34 and one requires that
the accident must be definitely located as to the time and place
where it occurred. 35
It is significant from this historical and statutory analysis that
although the Nebraska Legislature added several requirements
to the previous definition of accident contained in the then exist-
ing law as expressed in the English decisions, no requirement
was included that the cause of the harm be unexpected or un-
foreseen. The use of the phrase "unexpected or unforeseen
event" would appear to be a statutory codification of the English
judicial definition going back to Lord Macnaghten's words. The
fact that Nebraska has employed part of the judicial definition
and changed part would seem to indicate a purpose to incorpo-
rate the unchanged portion of the English judicial definition
that an unexpected injury is an accident even though the means
of producing the injury may not have been unexpected.
36
30 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262 (1958); FLA. STAT. § 440.02(6) (1959);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1021 (1951)
(suddenly or violently); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020 (Supp. 1960);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616:020
(Supp. 1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (Supp. 1957) ("sudden
and tangible happening").
31 See statutes cited note 27 supra.
32 Brittons, Ltd. v. Turvey, [1905] A.C. 230.
33 LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1021 (1951); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020 (Supp.
1960); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151 (Reissue 1960); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 616.020 (Supp. 1959). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (Supp.
1957) ("producing an immediate or prompt result").
34 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262 (1958) ("by accidental means"); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 616.110 (Supp. 1957) ("from external force"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 51.08.100 (Supp. 1957) ("occurring from without").
35 IDAHO CODE AN. § 72-201 (1949).
36 See, e.g., Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W.2d 689 (1942): "The
language of our unemployment compensation law quoted above
[dealing with stoppage of work] was a substantial reenactment
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1961
III. THE INITIAL PERIOD-1914 TO 1934
Throughout this period, the decisions of the Nebraska Sf-
preme Court consistently applied the English rule that for work-
men's compensation purposes an unexpected injury from ordinary
work constitutes an accident. For twenty years, the court al-
lowed compensation for injury from exertion or strain without
regard to the severity of the exertion, and without regard to
whether or not the exertion was a part of the performance of the
regular duties of the employee.
In 1917, in Manning v. Pomerene,3 7 a steam fitter's helper, in
what the court labeled a part of his expected duties,38 attempted
to push two steel "I" beams across the floor. The opinion noted
that these beams resting upon iron would usually slide easily
when pushed.39 The employee ruptured a blood vessel and suf-
fered a paralytic stroke. The court referred to the statutory def-
inition of "accident" and permitted recovery, stating:
40
It is insisted that no "unexpected or unforeseen event, happen-
ing suddenly and violently," occurred; that sickness arising from
the placing of his body by plaintiff against the beams and surg-
ing back and forwards could not reasonably be said to be "an
unforeseen event;" and that it did not happen suddenly and vio-
lently except as it was produced by the plaintiff himself. It is
said that this language was "clearly meant to limit recoveries
to accident such as the breaking of machinery, or the unex-
pected cutting or wounding of employee's person by some break-
of the English National Insurance Act of 1911. This language, it
appears, had received a settled construction by the English author-
ities charged with the administration of this English act long prior
to the adoption of it by ourselves. The well-established rule of con-
struction applicable to this Nebraska enactment, under these circum-
stances, is that a state by adopting a statute of another state adopts
the construction which has been given the statute so adopted by
such other state." Id. at 128, 2 N.W.2d at 692.
37 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917).
38 Id. at 128-29, 162 N.W. at 493: "From this award the defendant ap-
peals, insisting: (1) that the removal of the beams was not within
the scope of the plaintiff's employment .... The end of these
beams projected over and obstructed the passageway, and, while
there were steam-fitters near whom he might have called from
their work to move the beams far enough to allow him to pass, it
was perfectly natural and to be expected that in order to perform
his duties he should move or attempt to move them himself."
39 Id. at 129, 162 N.W. at 493: "They were lying upon a projecting
part of the boiler, and the testimony is that beams resting upon iron,
as these were, usually slide easily when pushed."
40 Ibid. This definition was restated and applied in Van Vleet v. Public
Serv. Co. of York, 111 Neb. 51, 195 N.W. 467 (1923).
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ing or falling or exploding of apparatus, machinery, or tools."
To hold this would unduly limit the meaning of this clause.
The unforeseen event was the straining, weakening or lesion of
the blood vessels of the brain or stomach, and this was an un-
foreseen event happening suddenly.
Young v. Western Furniture & Mtg. Co.41 was a similar
1917 decision. The employee was a general helper in a manu-
facturing plant. In cleaning and oiling two motors, a part of his
ordinary duties, he was required to climb a ladder on a hot day
and suffered heat prostration from which he died. Although the
building was an extremely hot place in which to work, the em-
ployee was performing his normal duties in a usual way. One of
the defenses raised was that heat stroke was not an accident
within the compensation statute. The court, in finding an acci-
dent and allowing compensation, stated: 42 "A stronger man might
have lived, but it is enough that the industry brought about this
man's death. An accident is an event which proceeds from an
unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and
therefore not expected."
Recovery was also allowed in a companion case for death
from heat stroke suffered by an employee while working in the
same laundry in which he had been employed for fifteen years.
43
41 101 Neb. 696, 164 N.W. 712 (1917).
42 Id. at 699-700, 164 N.W. at 714.
43 Kanscheit v. Garrett Laundry, 101 Neb. 702, 164 N.W. 708 (1917).
Later, the Nebraska court added a requirement that in order to be
compensable, the employee must be subjected to a greater risk and
hazard of heat stroke than is the public generally. Uribe v. Woods
Bros. Constr. Co., 124 Neb. 243, 246 N.W. 233 (1933) (laborer-car-
penter working on construction of bridge over Platte River-recovery
denied); Herbert v. State, 124 Neb. 312, 246 N.W. 454 (1933) (ce-
ment inspector working at mixing dock-recovery allowed); Brady
v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 127 Neb. 786, 257 N.W. 66 (1934) (cream
station checker who drove over public highway on hot day-re-
covery denied); McNeil v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 129 Neb. 329, 261
N.W. 694 (1935) (watchman at flour mill sheltered from breeze-
recovery allowed); Hayes v. McMullen, 128 Neb. 432, 259 N.W. 165
(1935) (road grader removing snow from public highway-recovery
allowed for snow blindness); Laudenklos v. Department of Roads
& Irrigation, 132 Neb. 234, 271 N.W. 290 (1937) (employee shovel-
ing snow on public highway-recovery allowed for freezing of hand).
It is not clear from the language of these cases whether the require-
ment relates to "that to which the general public is exposed," "that
to which the public generally in that locality is subject," "those to
which workmen generally in that locality were subjected," or the
conditions "under which all of the other employees were working
at the time." It is clear that none of these employees were denied
recovery because the risk of heat or cold was ordinary to their
employment. These cases were not a rejection of the earlier hold-
ings that the employee had suffered an "accident" from heat stroke.
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In the Young opinion, one of a number of cases from other jur-
isdictions cited by the court was the English decision, Dotzauer
v. Strand Palace Hotel, Ltd.,4 4 in which a dishwasher with pecul-
iarly sensitive skin was held to have suffered an accident when
his ordinary duties required him to wash crockery in hot water,
soft soap and caustic soda for a number of hours, which caused
his finger nails to come off and disabled him for four months.
In Derr v. Kirkpatrick,45 recovery was allowed to a helper-
clerk-repairman who was required as a part of his normal and
ordinary duties to help carry a 600 pound stove over some mud.
He could not point to the specific occurrence of the injury, but
sometime in the process of carrying the stove and lifting it onto
a truck, he suffered a severe strain, the lowered resistance from
which gave rise to bronchial pneumonia and ultimately resulted
in a paralysis of his hands.
46
Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaughenbaugh47 was similar in holding that
They were a clarification of the requirement that the accident must
arise "out of and in the course of employment." This is analogous
to the employee who is caught in a sudden storm, Gale v. Krug Park
Amusement Co., 114 Neb. 432, 208 N.W. 739 (1926) (revovery de-
nied), or robbed by a highwayman, Ridenour v. Lewis, 121 Neb.
823, 238 N.W. 745 (1931) (recovery allowed); Goodwin v. Omaha
Printing Co., 131 Neb. 212, 267 N.W. 419 (1936) (recovery allowed
for death by hitchhiker). The question is one of employment-
connection and unless the employment has increased the employee's
chances of harm over those of the public generally, the injury does
not arise out of and in the course of employment. This is not in-
consistent with the routine exertion approach allowing recovery for
injuries resulting from the strain of ordinary work. An employ-
ment has not caused the heat to which the general public is exposed,
but it has caused the risks of even routine exertion. Perhaps the
advent of air conditioning methods at an economical cost has made
even the risk of ordinary heat an employment risk. The "injury-by-
the-elements" cases have through the years constituted a separate
class of decisions in which recovery or denial of compensation has
depended upon whether or not the employment has increased the
risk of harm to which the general public has been exposed. Fac-
tually, the issue has been handled on an all or none basis. Either
it was the heat which caused the heat stroke or the employment
which caused the injury. The court has not been faced with a
record which showed that heat stroke was caused by work condi-
tions other than heat.
44 3 B.W.C.C. 387 (Ct. App. 1910).
45 106 Neb. 403, 184 N.W. 91 (1921).
46 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151 (4) (Reissue 1960) defines injury to include
"such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom."
47 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930). The opinion states only that lift-
ing the stove was "in the course of his duties." It would seem from
the opinion that these were "ordinary duties."
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a salesman for a gas company was allowed recovery for a hem-
orrhage in his right groin and leg caused by strain in lifting a
stove and helping in its installation. Actually, the strain was
caused in part by a pre-existing circulatory disorder resulting
from the inhalation of gas fumes over a period of time. Because
the strain was an accident, the employee was entitled to full
compensation for the total resulting disability. The court did
not have to resolve the issue of whether under prior decisions 48
the underlying disability from gassing was, itself, a compensable
accident or a then noncompensable occupational disease.4 9
These cases rested on the proposition that the sudden and
violent producing of the injured condition was the accident. The
bursting of the vessels or tearing of muscles satisfied the re-
quirement of "by accident" whether happening by impact, exer-
tion, or operation of the elements of nature. The only distin-
guishing feature was that in the exertion cases the technical oc-
currence of the accident took place inside the body, rather than
both on the outside and the inside, as a result of the unexpected
and unforeseen effect of external forces.
Throughout this initial period covering the first twenty years
of the compensation statute, a number of claimants lost in the
supreme court because of a failure to sustain the factual burden
of proving an accident. 50  But at no time did the court require
48 VanVleet v. Public Serv. Co., 111 Neb. 51, 195 N.W. 467 (1923) (al-
lowing recovery for repeated gassings on the basis of Manning v.
Pomerene definition); Blair v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage Co., 102
Neb. 16, 165 N.W. 893 (1917) (no suddenness or unexpectedness pro-
ducing objective symptoms where employee was required to work
cleaning a very warm boiler for about a week and then put to work
outside in fifteen to eighteen degree below zero weather for a week
and contracted rheumatism).
49 Neb. Laws c. 198, § 52(b), p. 601 (1913), Neb. Comp. Stat. § 48-
152(b) (1929): "The said terms shall in no case be construed to
include occupational disease in any form, or any contagious or in-
fectious disease contracted during the course of employment. .. ."
50 Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Kizer, 127 Neb. 34, 254 N.W. 690 (1934);
Saxton v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 125 Neb. 468, 250 N.W. 655 (1933); Huff-
man v. Great W. Sugar Co., 125 Neb. 302, 250 N.W. 70 (1933); Par-
sons Oil Co. v. Schlitt, 125 Neb. 223, 249 N.W. 613 (1933); Mullen
v. City of Hastings, 125 Neb. 172, 249 N.W. 560 (1933); Kuhtnick v.
Carey, 124 Neb. 761, 248 N.W. 89 (1933); De Bruler v. City of Bayard,
124 Neb. 566, 247 N.W. 347 (1933); Towsend v. Loeffelbein, 123 Neb.
791, 244 N.W. 418 (1932); Bartlett v. Eaton, 123 Neb. 599, 243 N.W.
772 (1932); Siedlik v. Swift & Co., 122 Neb. 99, 239 N.W. 466 (1931);
Kresl v. Village of Dodge, 121 Neb. 882, 238 N.W. 752 (1931); Omaha
& Council Bluffs St. Ry. v. Johnson, 109 Neb. 526, 191 N.W. 691
(1922). In what appears to be an effect of the depression, there
was a rash of these unproven claims in the early 1930's.
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that not only the injury, itself, but also the means of producing
it must be accidental. The Nebraska court remained firmly com-
mitted to the English view (and the view of the large majority
of American courts) that an unexpected injury is an accident
under the workmen's compensation statute.
IV. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION-1934 TO 1941
During this period, the court, without specifically consider-
ing the issue, changed the fundamental concept of accident as it
had existed under the English law and under the Nebraska stat-
ute and cases for twenty years. There was no specific rejection
of past cases, and no extended attempt to distinguish them. The
impression from reading the cases of this period as a whole is
that the new rule simply grew up in a several stage development
without regard for the substantive holdings of the past decisions.
The pivotal case was Gilkeson v. Northern Gas Eng'r Co.,51
a 1934 decision in which the court first announced the rule that
an injury by strain from exertion ordinarily incident to employ-
ment is not an accident under the statute. The employee was a
fifty-one year old pipe line superintendent. He pushed and lifted
an automobile which had gotten stuck going up a muddy hill
and had rolled backward, to keep the automobile from going over
a bank. There was no striking or slipping, but as a result of the
exertion experienced in lifting and pushing the automobile, the
employee suffered a heart attack which caused him total perma-
nent disability.
The court denied recovery because the exertion which caused
the injury was ordinarily incident to the occupation involved and
would not have been disabling were it not for the previous in-
firmity of the employee. The opinion states that none of the
previous cases cited by it arose merely from exertion no greater
than normal to the employment involved. 52  But the Gilkeson
opinion cites only one of the previous exertion cases, the Skelly
Oil case, in which there is every indication that the injury to the
stove salesman in lifting the stove was a part of his ordinary
duties. Certainly, it would seem that lifting a stove to assist in
its installation by a salesman is equally as much a part of his
ordinary duties as keeping a car from sliding over a bank on a
muddy road would be to a pipe line superintendent. And the
Gilkeson opinion simply does not cite the other earlier exertion
cases.
51 127 Neb. 124, 254 N.W. 714 (1934).
52 Id. at 128, 254 N.W. at 716.
AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING INFIRMITIES 117
The court relied heavily upon the Nebraska apportionment
statute which then provided: 53
If an employee receives an injury, which, of itself, would only
cause partial disability, but which, combine[d] with a previous
disability, does in fact cause a total disability, the employer shall
only be liable as for the partial disability, so far as the subse-
quent injury is concerned.
The statute was significantly amended in 1947 to provide a
method of allocating the payment of compensation for subse-
quent injuries causing permanent total disability to a previously
disabled employee between his employer and a state-maintained
second injury fund.54 The present statute does not appear to
limit the conditions under which compensation is otherwise pay-
able or the amount of the compensation, but, rather, provides
merely for a method of allocating the compensation payments.55
The cases since Gilkeson, however, have continued to rely on the
Gilkeson decision without questioning its authority. Also, this
statute applies only to an employee with "a previous disability."
53 Neb. Laws c. 198, § 28, p. 592 (1913), Neb. Comp. Stat. § 48-128
(1929).
54 Neb. Laws c. 174, § 1, p. 559 (1947), as amended, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-128 (Reissue 1960): "If an employee receives an injury which
of itself would cause only partial disability but which, combined
with a previous disability other than one caused by disease, does in
fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall be liable
only for the partial disability which would have resulted from the
second injury in the absence of any preexisting disability, and for
the additional disability the employee shall be compensated out of
a special fund created for that purpose, which sum so set aside shall
be known as the Second Injury Fund."
55 See Franzen v. Blakley, 155 Neb. 621, 52 N.W.2d 833 (1952). In
Gilkeson, the court interpreted the language of the previous statute,
"would . . . cause partial disability," carried forward into the pres-
ent second injury fund section, to deny compensation if the exertion
alone without the pre-existing infirmity would not have caused dis-
ability. This would seem to be an irrelevant consideration as to
whether some compensation is owed to the employee, although it
might be relevant to determine whether the employer or a state
fund should be responsible for the payments. The plain facts of the
Gilkeson case were that the strain of pushing the automobile did in
fact cause Mr. Gilkeson to be permanently and totally disabled.
Had Mr. Gilkeson been fortunate enough to have had a degenerative
condition in his ankle which would have caused him to slip and suf-
fer the heart attack, he would have been compensated even though
the slip alone would not have produced disability. See Gilcrest Lum-
ber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N.W. 578 (1922). This rule of
the Gilkeson case has not been restated in subsequent decisions. It
would probably be impossible in an exertion or strain case to estab-
lish as a matter of medical fact that the exertion or strain would
have caused disability were it not for the pre-existing infirmity.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1961
In the sense used in this statute, Mr. Gilkeson was probably not
disabled. "Disability" apparently was used in this statute as an
inability to perform the required duties of the actual occupation
of the employee or some substantial physical loss of a body func-
tion.56 There is nothing in the opinion which would indicate
that although Mr. Gilkeson may have had prior heart trouble,
had his teeth removed and had other maladies, he was not able
to perform fully his normal duties on a day to day basis.
In 1937, in Dymak v. Haskins Bros.,57 the court appeared once
again to permit recovery for strain resulting from performance
of the normal duties of the employee. A female wrapping ma-
chine operator in a soap factory wrenched her back in attempt-
ing to turn a fly wheel on a machine which would not start.
She had a congenital defect of the back, which made her spine
weaker than normal and more susceptible to strain than a nor-
mal spine. The court permitted a recovery without discussing
the ordinary exertion rules and with the statement that recov-
ery should be allowed even though the same injury would not
have occurred in a sound person. The Gilkeson case was dis-
tinguished on the basis that the court had held that Mr. Gilkeson
had a previous disability and that factually the previous disabil-
56 In a number of cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court has allowed
compensation benefits based upon the total resulting disability in
spite of a pre-existing infirmity which would seem to have con-
stituted a compensable disability had it arisen by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment. The courts often award
compensation even though the employee retains the same job or
secures a more remunerative one. For purposes of computing bene-
fits, disability is measured in terms of "earning capacity" rather
than actual earnings. -Many decisions refer to what would appear
to have been a "disability" had compensation been sought therefor
as a "condition" or "impairment" unless it actually interferes with
the performance of the employee's actual work. A serious physical
loss of a body function would probably be afforded similar treat-
ment. See, e.g., Turner v. Beatrice Foods Co., 165 Neb. 338, 85 N.W.
2d 721 (1957) (bad back requiring use of a low back brace); Knud-
sen v. McNeely, 159 Neb. 227, 66 N.W.2d 412 (1954) (previous frac-
ture of arm immobilized by metal bone plate and loops of wire,
which ached in damp weather); Sporcic v. Swift & Co., 149 Neb.
246, 30 N.W.2d 891 (1948) (several past infectious diseases and in-
juries and arthritic condition in spine); Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugen-
baugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930) (noncompensable occupa-
tional disease); Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190
N.W. 578 (1922) (syphilis). But cf. Towner v. Western Contracting
Corp., 164 Neb. 235, 82 N.W.2d 253 (1957) (herniated disc in back
treated as a "condition" rather than a "disability" for benefit pur-
poses).
57 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937).
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ity was not increased by the strain.58 Miss Dymak, on the other
hand, had worked for the same employer for eleven years prior
to the accident and had never suffered from a strain or injury
in her back. Thus, Miss Dymak did not have a "previous dis-
ability." From the standpoint of the actual physical health of the
employee and the relationship of the employee to the employer,
there is little to distinguish Dymak from Gilkeson. It appears
that in both cases the employee was able to accomplish his or
her assigned work without any limitation on the effectiveness of
performance caused by the pre-existing infirmity. Neither had
a functional loss of use of any part of the body. It does not seem
clear why Mr. Gilkeson was considered as having a previous
disability, but Miss Dymak was not.
The next year, in Shamp v. Landy Clark Co.,5 9 the court de-
nied recovery to the widow of a forty-nine year old coal hauler
who was found dying of a heart attack in the back of the truck
of coal he was unloading on his second day of work for the em-
ployer. The holding might have been placed solely on the ground
that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof of causal
connection between the employment and death.6 0
58 Id. at 311, 271 N.W. at 862.
59 134 Neb. 73, 277 N.W. 802 (1938).
60 The court applied the rule that where an employee dies under
mysterious circumstances during his work, the burden of proving
that the death was an accident arising out of the employment rests
upon the claimant for compensation. See Mullen v. City of Hastings,
125 Neb. 172, 249 N.W. 560 (1933). Recoveries had recently been
denied to an employee who could not prove with reasonable cer-
tainty that trauma could have caused an infected condition in his
hands, and to the dependents of a worker who died of hernia who
could not show any time or place in the employment where it might
have occurred. See Skochdopole v. State, 133 Neb. 440, 275 N.W.
665 (1937); Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. Petersen, 127 Neb. 476, 256
N.W. 37 (1934). The court also indicated that Mr. Shamp's heart
attack was not an accident because there was no evidence of violence.
But the undisputed evidence of death by heart attack should have
constituted violence within the meaning of the statute. The court
relied upon a previous holding that where a worker slipped into a
river and allegedly'contracted a cold which developed into pneumo-
nia, he had not shown that the accident occurred suddenly and vio-
lently. Lange v. Gage County Elec. Co., 133 Neb. 388, 275 N.W. 462
(1937). See Blair v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage Co., 102 Neb. 16, 165
N.W. 893 (1917). Cf. Chatt v. Massman Constr. Co., 138 Neb. 288, 293
N.W. 105 (1940) (recovery allowed in a similar situation where worker
died of a chill from falling in a river, but had also injured and
bruised his leg). And the court later held that a mental breakdown
may happen "violently" within the meaning of the accident defini-
tion, even though it may not involve "violence to the physical struc-
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But the court additionally stated that an injury caused by
the strain of ordinary exertion is not an accident under the
statute: 61
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Ole Shamp
did not come to his death during ordinary exertion required of
him to perform his work in the ordinary manner. The rule,
then, to be applied is that an injury or death is not compen-
sable as an accident under the compensation act when sustained
during the ordinary exertion required to perform the employee's
duties in the ordinary and normal manner. Gilkeson v. Northern
Gas Engineering Co....
Certainly if one is to interpret the language in the Dymak opin-
ion as indicating that the Gilkeson case held merely that Mr.
Gilkeson's pushing the automobile did not in fact cause the heart
attack,62 the distinction was lost in the Shamp opinion. Shamp
seems to indicate clearly that even though Mr. Shamp's work
were shown to have in fact caused the heart attack, the injury
would not be compensable because it arose out of ordinary exer-
tion.
Three years later, the shift became complete in Rose v. City
of Fairmont.63 The plaintiff was a fifty year old city water and
light commissioner, a position he had held for twelve years. The
city owned a Model "T" which had a starter, but the starter was
not used because it ran down the battery. On a cold morning,
the commissioner and a helper h~d to take turns cranking the
motor to get it started. From this exertion as a part of his ordi-
nary duties, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack. The court de-
nied recovery, on what has since become a black letter axiom
under the Nebraska compensation statute: 64 "Mere exertion
which is not greater than ordinarily incident to employment, but
which combines with a preexisting disease to produce disability
is not a compensable 'accidental injury.'" The opinion of the
court relies upon Gilkeson and Shamp. It states that "cases
cited by plaintiff, such as Manning v. Pomerene . . . can each be
distinguished from the case at bar."65  Manning v. Pomerene66 is
the only exertion case in the list cited. And no explanation is
ture of the body" as that phrase is used in the definition of "injury."
Bekelski v. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
61 Shamp v. Landy Clark Co., 134 Neb. 73, 81, 277 N.W. 802, 807 (1938).
62 See note 58 supra.
63 140 Neb. 550, 300 N.W. 574 (1941).
64 Id. at 555, 300 N.W. at 577.
65 Id. at 554-55, 300 N.W. at 576.
66 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917).
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offered in the opinion as to just why Manning is distinguishable.
Manning, it will be recalled, had specifically held that the burst-
ing of the blood vessels in the employee's brain or stomach as
he pushed two "I" beams in the ordinary performance of his
duties constituted an accident under the compensation statute.
Factually, the Rose case, which involved starting a cold engine,
is virtually identical to the English decision in Hensey v. White
67
which had been overruled by Fenton v. Thorley & Co.68 in 1903.
The practical effect of the Rose opinion would seem to have been
that all of the early Nebraska decisions which had held that an
unexpected injury was an accident were now overruled, even
though the court had done no more than merely to announce a
new rule of law.
The Rose opinion also makes it clear that any slipping or
falling in connection with ordinary work or ordinary exertion
may be sufficient to make the entire disability an injury by acci-
dent. The court approved and distinguished its recent decision
in Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers Tel. Co.69 The plaintiff
was one of defendant's linemen. He had climbed a telephone
pole and fastened his spur onto the pole. The spur slipped a
few inches and the plaintiff caught himself with his left arm.
As a resulting of the slipping, or the slipping plus the exertion
of catching himself and the exertion of climbing the pole, the
plaintiff suffered a heart attack. The court allowed recovery on
the basis that the work connected aggravation of a pre-existing
physical infirmity by accident was compensable. The fact that
there was a slipping, however slight, made the injury an acci-
dent even though it arose out of the employee's ordinary duties,
and even though it may have combined both with the pre-existing
heart condition of the employee and the routine exertion of
climbing the telephone pole. This was consistent with the pre-
vious cases which had held that an employee is entitled to work-
men's compensation for his total resulting disability where a
pre-existing disease or other condition is aggravated by accident.
For example, recovery had been granted to employees with
syphilis for slight scrapes on the leg or back which later ulcer-
ated and caused disability, even though the scrapes might have
gone virtually unnoticed by an ordinary person.70 And a person
67 [1900] 1 Q.B. 481.
68 [1903] A.C. 433.
69 139 Neb. 182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941).
70 Miller v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 123 Neb. 793, 244 N.W. 401 (1932);
Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N.W. 578 (1922).
See Annot., 28 A.L.R. 204 (1924).
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with an underlying mental disorder had been held to be en-
titled to compensation for the disability caused by a very minor
electric shock.
71
Judge Carter dissented in the Schirmer case on the basis
that "[i]t is more likely that plaintiff's heart condition caused
what he chooses to call an accident than that the alleged trauma
caused his heart ailment." 72  This may have been true as a mat-
ter of fact, just as the syphilis or mental disorder may have had
much more to do with those disabilities than the slight scrapes
or electric shocks. Judge Carter's position in this regard is quite
similar to some of the recent tort decisions of other states which
have been unwilling to push liability for aggravation to the
point where a third party is liable for a mere triggering of a pre-
existing infirmity which could be activated by a large number
of variable events.7 3 But the crucial fact in Schirmer is that it
was the employment which actually produced the disability, and
not a natural progression of the physical disorder. The policy
of the workmen's compensation law to place the costs of work-
connected injuries on the economic product involved is consid-
erably broader than the tort liability of third parties. For these
reasons, compensation was, and should have been allowed. It
would seem, further, that compensation should be allowed on the
71 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121, 227 N.W. 449 (1929). See
Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330
(1944).
72 Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers Tel. Co., 139 Neb. 182, 187, 296
N.W. 875, 878 (1941).
73 Compare Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961) (4-3
decision) (tort damages awarded for "severe emotional and neuro-
logical disturbances" to child improperly placed in chair lift) with
Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960) (no tort
liability for emotional illness set off by minor automobile accident
causing imaginary fright of killing child). See Smith & Soloman,
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 87 (1943). Most of the
recent compensation cases would reach an opposite result. Compare
Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960)
(compensation allowed for mental breakdown caused by production
line stress), and Olson v. F. I. Crane Lumber Co., 107 N.W.2d 223
(Minn. 1961) (compensation allowed for suicide from depression
over heart attack caused by excessive heat and humidity at work),
with Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d
758 (3d Dep't 1959) (compensation denied for emotional breakdown
of taxicab driver during police investigation of minor automobile
accident). See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for
Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129 (1961). See also Mc-
Millan v. Western Pac. R.R., 54 Cal. 2d 841, 357 P.2d 449 (1960)
(emotional collapse from duties negligently required by employer
recoverable under Federal Employers' Liability Act).
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same basis whether the injury comes about from slipping, a
scrape, a shock, or exertion.
Following his dissent in Schirmer, Judge Carter concurred
in a separate opinion in the Rose case.74 His position again was
that the bad heart was a more significant factor in causing the
resulting disability than was cranking the Model "T." But this
position, while it presents a logically consistent view, is not in
keeping with the purpose and intent of the workmen's compen-
sation statute to compensate the employee for those disabilities
which the employment has in fact brought about. Were it not
for the slipping in Schirmer, the employee would not have had
his heart attack-at least not at that time, and perhaps not ever.
The same is true in the case of Mr. Rose, even though he was
simply cranking a car and did not slip.
V. THE CURRENT PERIOD-1941 TO 1961
Throughout this period, the rule has been applied consist-
ently that disability from exertion no greater than that normally
incident to the employment of the injured employee does not
constitute an accident under the workmen's compensation stat-
ute. For example, compensation was denied to a fireman with
a pre-existing arthritic and heart condition for disability from
physical exertion in handling a fire hose and exposure to smoke
and fumes from fighting a fire for about three hours in a smoke-
filled basement which at the time caused repeated vomiting by
the firemen; 75 to a fifty-one year old cabinet maker and refin-
isher of furniture for ruptured vessels causing blindness in one
eye from lifting and pushing a fifty pound spray bench end-
wise through a door; 76 to a forty-five year old tire and battery
man for a fatal heart attack from repeated attempts to start a
small gasoline engine with a starter rope;77 to a carpenter for a
hernia from pulling twenty foot long sheathing boards to the
74 Rose v. City of Fairmont, 140 Neb. 550, 556, 300 N.W. 574, 577 (1941):
"In both cases coronary thrombosis was the cause of the purported
accident and the resulting disability. Instead of an accident causing
the disability in each of these cases, the diseased condition of the
claimant caused that which was described as an accident."
75 Brown v. City of Omaha, 141 Neb. 587, 4 N.W.2d 564 (1942). See
Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 165 Neb. 32, 84 N.W.2d
169 (1957) (sixty-two year old police chief with heart ailment suf-
fered heart attack after subduing by use of various methods includ-
ing tear gas an armed insane man who was staked out in a house
and holding children as hostages).
76 Roccaforte v. State Furniture Co., 142 Neb. 768, 7 N.W.2d 656 (1943).
77 Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945).
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roof top of a house;78 to a fifty year old lady rocket packer for
injuries to her shoulder and arm from suffering repeated jars and
strains in using her body to stop and release boxes on a con-
veyor belt;79 to a shader (classifier) of tile in a tile manufactur-
ing plant for strain to his upper spine from lifting tiles and put-
ting them on a conveyor belt;80 and to a twenty-six year old
garbage collector who suffered injuries in his neck which para-
lyzed him for life from lifting and dumping a fifty or sixty
pound, thirty gallon, barrel of garbage into a truck.8 1
At the other extreme, an employee injured by an external
"event" has consistently been held to have been injured by acci-
dent, regardless of whether or not the event is incident to his
ordinary employment. If the employee can show that the injury
was caused by a slip, trip, stumble, fall, bump, or some compar-
able label, he has suffered an accident.
8 2
In fact, an employee may be entitled to compensation for
what might otherwise be called "mere exertion, which is no
greater than that ordinarily incident to the employment" where
there is some sort of a slipping which has caused the employee
to exert himself. For example, compensation has been allowed
to a warehouse employee with a kidney ailment, whose duties
included dumping sixty pound sacks of empty coffee cans onto
78 Muff v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 35 N.W.2d 597 (1949). See Foster v.
Atlas Lumber Co., 155 Neb. 129, 50 N.W.2d 637 (1952), noted in 31
NEB. L. REV. 632 (1952) (sixty-two year old lumber yard manager
sustained a hernia from carrying a fifty pound paint carton 150 feet).
79 Murray v. National Gypsum Co., 160 Neb. 463, 70 N.W.2d 394 (1955).
See Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equip. Co., 172 Neb. 197, 109 N.W.2d
111 (1961) (sixty-seven year old common laborer previously engaged
in grinding corners on truck bodies in assembly plant developed a
paralysis from operating a small airpowered hammer riveting gun
and bucking rivets, who, although he had never done this work
before, had complained that the work was too much for him, and
had been assured by his boss that the work would be good for his
rheumatism).
80 Jones v. Yankee Hill Brick Mfg. Co., 161 Neb. 404, 73 N.W.2d 394
(1955).
81 Feagins v. Carver, 162 Neb. 116, 75 N.W.2d 379 (1956). See Carranza
v. Payne-Larson Furniture Co., 165 Neb. 352, 85 N.W.2d 694 (1957)
(twenty-six year old common laborer and warehouseman ruptured
disc in his back from helping lift a 250 pound Serta bed); Schanhols
v. Scottsbluff Bean & Elevator Co., 168 Neb. 626, 97 N.W.2d 220
(1959) (employee of elevator engaged in processing beans suffered
a back strain from hurriedly sweeping dirt from a clogged conveyor
and shoveling beans which leaked or fell from the conveyor).
82 See, e.g., Plambeck v. Natkin & Co., 171 Neb. 774, 107 N.W.2d 734
(1961) (steamfitter lifting heavy pipe slipped and strained his back).
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a conveyor, who suffered a sprained back in trying to grab a
broken or torn sack to keep it from falling apart; 83 to a mechanic-
fitter who suffered a strained back due to the slip or uneven
lifting of a fellow employee while helping lift a stove which
caused a wobble, lurch or jerk;8 4 and to a twenty-one year old
grocery clerk who suffered a strained back in attempting to
retain control of a falling carton which had slipped from his
hands as he was stacking it. 85
In two cases, the court has held that an employee's injury
was due at least in part to unusual exertion. Anderson v. Cow-
ger, 6 in 1954, involved a heart attack suffered by a forty-one
year old salesman-warehouseman for a wholesale grocery busi-
ness. While out on his route, he was driving blind through a
heavy snowstorm and ran into a snowdrift at about twenty-five
miles per hour without being able to apply his brakes. The sud-
den stop jarred his arms and shoulders. He stayed in the car
for five minutes, crawled out a window, and then walked thirty
to fifty yards through knee deep, blowing snow to a highway
department snowplow. He rode in the cab of the snowplow for
fifteen to twenty minutes, during which he suffered cramps.
After arriving at a filling station, he sustained the heart attack.
The court noted that the exertion required of the employee
was actually no greater than his normal duties of lifting and
stacking 100 pound sacks.8 7 The opinion restated the rule that
"mere exertion, which is not greater than that ordinarily inci-
dent to the employment, cannot of itself constitute an accident,"
but distinguished its application to the case:8 8
But here the accident did not consist solely of appellee's exertion
in wading through the snow. This had been preceded by the
jarring he received when his car came to a sudden stop. There
was also the additional fact that he was walking through a snow-
storm in freezing weather with the wind blowing up to 50 miles
an hour.
The combination of all these elements was said to make the ex-
ertion greater than that ordinarily incident to the employee's
83 Tucker v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 43 N.W.2d 522 (1950).
84 Gilbert v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770
(1953). It is not clear whether a "wobbling, lurching or jerking"
without any "slipping" is an accident. See Carranza v. Payne-Lar-
son Furniture Co., 165 Neb. 352, 85 N.W.2d 694 (1957).
85 Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958).
86 158 Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
87 Id. at 777, 65 N.W.2d at 57.
88 Id. at 778, 65 N.W.2d at 57.
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employment, 9 and to make the case more comparable to Skelly
Oil Co. v. Gaughenbaugh9° and Manning v. Pomerene.9 1 It is
submitted that Skelly Oil and Manning, discussed above, would
have treated the unexpected and unforeseen heart attack caused
by ordinary exertion of the employment as an accident, whether
or not there was an external jarring or a fifty mile per hour
wind. Anderson v. Cowger also rested its decision in part on the
fact that the injury was contributed to by a greater exposure to
the elements than that of the general public in the community.
92
In 1960, the court stated that a heart attack of a fifty year
old general maintenance man and orderly in a small hospital may
have been caused, at least in part, by unusual exertion. In
Knaggs v. City of Lexington,9" the employee's normal duties in-
cluded moving 300 to 400 pound oxygen tanks, lifting patients
into and out of bed, and whatever maintenance work was re-
quired around the hospital. On the day of the heart attack, he
was called upon to fix a frequently clogged disposal unit. In the
process of plunging the unit, his feet slipped on the metal edge
of the sink and he fell on the lower part of his back or buttocks.
He had some pain at this time. Later, he was painting a floor
which required him to move a 500 pound refrigerator and a 1,500
pound deep freeze loaded with groceries. By pushing at alternate
ends of the deep freeze for about twenty or twenty-five minutes,
he succeeded in moving it four feet out from the wall so that
he could paint under it. As he moved the deep freeze and while
he painted, the pain continued to increase and finally he went
to a doctor. The medical opinions of the two doctors for the
employee were that the fall plus the extreme exertion of mov-
ing the heavy equipment played a large part in causing the heart
attack.9 4  After detailing this medical evidence, the court's
opinion stated: 95
In this respect we mention the circumstances of appellee moving
the fully-loaded deep freeze as not being exertion of a char-
acter as would ordinarily be incident to his employment. The
89 Id. at 778, 65 N.W.2d at 57: "Considering these other elements, we
think the exertion here was greater than that ordinarily incident to
appellee's employment ......
90 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930). See note 47 supra.
91 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917). See note 38 supra.
92 Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 778, 780-81, 65 N.W.2d 51, 57, 58
(1954).
93 171 Neb. 135, 105 N.W.2d 727 (1960).
94 Id. at 143-45, 105 N.W.2d at 733-34.
95 Id. at 145, 105 N.W.2d at 734.
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evidence shows it required extreme overexertion. We have
come to the conclusion, as did the district court, that appellee
suffered a compensable injury due to an accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment.
It is not clear whether the opinion relied alone upon the
overexertion of pushing the deep freeze as an accident, or upon
the combination of the fall plus the overexertion suggested in the
medical testimony. It may be significant that although both im-
pact and exertion are shown by the facts, the court did not rely
specifically upon the reasoning of Anderson v. Cowger that im-
pact plus extreme exertion equals overexertion. Anderson v.
Cowger is cited in the Knaggs opinion, but not in this phase of
the case. The court's reasoning in Knaggs seems to be focused
primarily on exertion rather than exertion following a fall.90
It is unlikely that Knaggs represents any serious departure
from the other recent cases. It gave full approval to all of the
ordinary exertion rules. It labels itself as an ad hoc decision
which must stand on its own facts.97 The facts in the opinion,
especially the medical testimony, clearly show a fall followed
by extreme exertion. Although Manning v. Pomerene9s was
argued to the court as being "on all fours with the case at bar,"99
it was not relied upon in this aspect of the court's opinion.
By the same token, Knaggs may not be dismissed as simply
an extreme application of the impact doctrine that any external
force, however slight, which contributes to an injury constitutes
an accident under the compensation statute. The reasoning of
the court did not specifically rely upon the fall to support its
conclusion that the employee had sustained an accident.
96 Judge Carter dissented on the ground that the employee had not
shown the "causal connection between the accident and the coronary
occlusion." His opinion seems to treat the fall as the accident,
rather than considering the fall plus the exertion, the exertion alone,
or the heart attack alone, as the accident. Judge Carter's opinion
favored the testimony of the three doctors testifying for the de-
fendant, and contended that the opinions of the employee's two
doctors were, by their own admissions, mere possibilities and con-
jecture. Judge Carter's dissenting opinion does seem to infer that
the majority of the court was not deciding the case on the basis
that the exertion of pushing the 1,500 pound deep freeze would, by
itself, have been a compensable accident were it not for the pres-
ence of the fall.
97 Id. at 145-46, 105 N.W.2d at 734.
98 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917).
99 Brief for Appellee, pp. 56-57, Knaggs v. City of Lexington, 171 Neb.
135, 105 N.W.2d 727 (1960).
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Perhaps Knaggs should simply be dismissed as indicating
that moving a 1,500 pound deep freeze loaded with groceries con-
stitutes unusual exertion for an employee who has never had to
move the deep freeze before-at least, if it follows a hard fall
and the exertion of routinely moving a 500 pound refrigerator.
This interpretation is fortified by the 1961 decision in Hladky v.
Omaha Body and Equip. Co.,100 which reaches an opposite re-
sult, but does not refer to Knaggs. In Hladky, the conventional
"mere exertion" rule was applied to deny compensation to the
common laborer who had never before run an airpowered ham-
mer riveting gun. He complained to his boss that the airham-
mer was shaking him up, but was told by the boss that it would
be good for his rheumatism. The jarring of the airhammer might
have been considered as an external force comparable to a slip,
trip or fall. The court held that even though the employee may
have suffered a paralysis causing him permanent disability from
running the riveting gun,' 0 ' it was not compensable because it
was caused by "mere exertion, which is no greater than that
ordinarily incident to the employment."
VI. AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT
NEBRASKA RULES
A. The Nebraska statutes do not explicitly state whether a
compensable injury must occur from an accidental "cause" or
whether an unexpected or unforeseen injury is itself an accident.
At the crux of the problem is the statutory phrase defining "ac-
cident" that it shall "be construed to mean an unexpected or un-
foreseen event." The court interprets this to require some sort
of an "external" event, a slipping or fall, or work requirements
which are unusually strenuous compared with the ordinary du-
ties of the particular employment. There is no reason why the
statute does not contemplate merely that an internal body fail-
ure of the worker is an "unexpected or unforeseen event" which
constitutes an "accident" if the other requirements of "accident"
are also met.
If the language of this statute is regarded as being ambig-
uous, then normally the court would adopt a liberal interpreta-
tion of the statute to provide compensation for workers whose
100 172 Neb. 197, 109 N.W.2d 111 (1961).
101 The court did not specifically decide whether or not the condition
was caused by the work. It held that in any event the injury was
the product of ordinary exertion and, therefore, not caused by acci-
dent. Id. at 203, 109 N.W.2d at 114-15.
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employment has caused them injury. 1 2  But read in the back-
ground of its historical development, the statute does not appear
to be ambiguous. The phrase "by accident" had a fixed mean-
ing under the English decisions interpreting the English legisla-
tion from which the American requirements were copied. These
cases had determined that an injury from the strain or exertion
of performing normal employment duties constituted an acci-
dent.10 3 The phrase "unexpected or unforeseen event" would
seem to be nothing more than a codification of the judicial lan-
guage of the House of Lords explaining that such an injury from
ordinary work was a compensable injury "by accident."'01 4  The
Nebraska statutory definition did add at least one requirement,
"happening suddenly and violently," which may not have been
a part of the English definition. From this, it is significant that
Nebraska did not require that the "cause" of the injury, rather
than the "result," be "by accident," although that issue had also
been litigated in the English cases.
The requirement of an unexpected or unforeseen event ap-
pears in the definition of all seven state statutes which define
"accident."'1 5  The courts of Alabama, 0 6 Florida,1 '0 Idaho, 0 8
102 See, e.g., Haler v. Gering Bean Co., 163 Neb. 748, 81 N.W.2d 152
(1957); Ludwickson v. Central States Elec. Co., 135 Neb. 371, 281
N.W. 603 (1938); Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278
N.W. 254 (1938); Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 59, 227 N.W. 87
(1929). This rule is stated extremely often in the decisions, even
in exertion cases. See Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half
Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1961).
Cf. Acton v. Wymore School Dist. No. 114, 172 Neb. 609, 615-16,
111 N.W.2d 368, 371 (1961): "The plaintiff calls our attention to the
fact that it has long been the policy of this state to give a liberal
construction to the workmen's compensation law so that its bene-
ficient purposes might not be thwarted by a technical refinement of
interpretation. This is still the policy. However, it has no applica-
tion in the instant case .... To hold that a sidewalk, which is a
part of the street and which is beyond the defendant's property line,
is a part of the defendant's premises as that term is used in the
Workmen's Compensation Act, would not be interpretation but leg-
islation. It is not the function of the court to create a liability where
the law creates none."
103 See notes 16 and 21 supra.
104 See notes 19 to 21 and 29 supra.
105 See note 28 supra.
106 Massey v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 227, 86 So. 2d 375
(1955).
107 Gray v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1952).
108 Lewis v. Department of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d
976 (1957).
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and Louisiana'0 9 all construe this language to require only an
unexpected injury, whether or not the work causing the injury
is "ordinary" for the employee. Alabama does this in spite of
additional statutory language referring to "accidental means.""u 0
Only Missouri and Nebraska refuse compensation for exertion or
strain resulting from performing the normal duties of employ-
ment, although Missouri seems more liberal than Nebraska in
holding that a specific activity involves extraordinary exertion.,"
Nevada has not yet ruled specifically on the issue and may lean
toward the Missouri-Nebraska cases."
12
B. The Nebraska "usual exertion" rules have in effect un-
duly extended aspects of assumption of risk into the compensa-
tion system. One of the purposes of workmen's compensation is
to require the economic product involved to bear as a cost of
production the blood of workmen injured in the production. This
concept is that the consumers of these products, especially where
the employment is hazardous or strenuous, should be called upon
to pay for a portion of the physical harm caused to the em-
ployees producing the item.113 Because of the benefit computa-
'09 Hemphill v. Tremont Lumber Co., 209 La. 885, 25 So. 2d 625 (1946);
Nickelberry v. Ritchie Grocer Co., 196 La. 1011, 200 So. 330 (1941).
See also Talbot v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 99 So. 2d 811 (La. Ct.
App. 1957).
110 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262 (1958); Massey v. United States Steel Corp.,
264 Ala. 227, 86 So. 2d 375 (1955).
1' See, e.g., Crow v. Missouri Implement Tractor Co., 307 S.W.2d 401
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1957); State v. Blair, 352 Mo. 1091, 180 S.W.2d 737
(1944). The cases hold exertion to be unusual without the presence
of impact.
112 See Smith y. Garside, 355 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1960). During the time
Minnesota had a similar statute, the court nominally stated ordinary
exertion rules, especially in heart cases, but found overexertion on
exceedingly slim facts. See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW 521-22, 530 (1952).
13 Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108 Neb. 455, 460, 187 N.W. 943, 945 (1922):
"The compensation act was not intended to impose a charge upon
the individual employer, but upon the industry or business or voca-
tion in which he was engaged, on the theory that the industry could
bear the loss resulting from personal injuries to its employees, and
that the burden could be passed on to the patrons of that industry
by charging up such losses to operating expense."; Tralle v. Hartman
Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 423, 217 N.W. 952, 954 (1928):
"It is generally understood that an outstanding purpose of the work-
men's compensation law was to shift from the employee to modern
industry the burden of economic waste or loss 'arising out of and
in the course of his employment' as a result of his injury or death."
See PROSSER, TORTS § 69, at 383 (2d ed. 1955): "The theory under-
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tions, the workmen's compensation system is geared to pay only
a portion of the employee's resulting loss of earning power from
disability. Nebraska pays medical bills in full," 4 but the ratio
of average weekly compensation benefits to average weekly
wages in Nebraska is only forty-nine per cent." 5 Thus, the em-
ployees in Nebraska are left by the underlying compensation
structure to assume fifty-one per cent of the disability loss from
work connected injury. To this extent, there is an assumption
of risk even though the statute has abolished the defenses of
assumption of risk, fellow servant rule, and contributory negli-
gence unless the accident is caused by the employee's wilful
negligence." 6
In practice, the medical costs and forty-nine per cent com-
pensation for disability placed by the compensation system on
employers may or may not be shifted to the consumer depend-
ing upon other production costs of the business." 7 The competi-
lying the workmen's compensation acts never has been stated better
than in the old campaign slogan [allegedly attributed to Lloyd
George], 'the cost of the product should bear the blood of the work-
man.' The accident losses of modern industry are to be treated as
a cost of production, like the breakage of tools or machinery. The
financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of the employee, and
placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs,
and so transfer it to the customer. In this he is aided and con-
trolled by a system of compulsory liability insurance, which equalizes
the burden over the entire industry. Through such insurance both
the master and the servant are protected at the expense of the
ultimate consumer." See also AARON, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION
AND THE LAW 183-84 (1957).
114 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1960). But the statute does not
provide for prosthetic devices, palliatives, retraining, or other re-
habilitation.
115 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 212,
STATE WoRIwE's COMPENSATION LAWS: A COMPARISON OF MAJOR
PROVISIONS WITH RECOmmENDED STANDARDS (1959). The recom-
mended standard is a benefit level equal to at least 662/3% of the
state's average weekly wage.
116 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-102, -109, -151(7) (Reissue 1960).
117 Cf. Witte, The Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 20 Am. LAB.
LEG. REV. 411, 414-15 (1930): "Varying costs do not necessarily
mean that the payments made by employers for compensation or
compensation insurance are not shifted to the consumers. Economic
theory teaches us that, both under conditions of competition and
under conditions of monopoly, these costs may be shifted, in whole
or in part, depending upon the elasticity of demand and other fac-
tors. It does not assert, however, that the entire cost is necessarily
or usually shifted, nor does it answer what part is passed on to the
consumers in any concrete case. Similarly, the extent to which
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tive system would allocate these costs between the consumers,
shareholders or business owners, managers, employees, suppliers,
and others interested in the economic enterprise. What the ordi-
nary exertion rules do is to require the employees, themselves,
to assume the additional risks of the medical bills and disability
losses which would otherwise be treated as a cost of production.
The "usual exertion" rules permit employers engaged in the
most strenuous sorts of occupations, whose consumers should
theoretically pay the highest costs of production for injuries to
the workers, to shift a portion of the risk of harm back to the
individual workers, themselves. To the extent that the workers
may be injured by strain or exertion, the individual workers,
themselves, and not the product, are forced to pay for their own
blood. If the employment calls upon an employee to lift 500
pound refrigerators as a part of his ordinary employment, then
the employee, and not the product, must bear the risk of physical
strain from the lifting. On the other hand, an employee who
is not required to lift may be compensated on an extraordinary
exertion principle for injuries from lifting a considerably lesser
weight. Supposedly, the employer who called upon his employees
to lift 500 pounds every day, and the consumers of those prod-
ucts, should be required to bear a greater cost for physical harm
caused to employees from the strain of lifting 500 pounds than
employers and consumers requiring no lifting. But the result
is exactly reversed in Nebraska. The individual employees of
the employer requiring strenuous work, and not the employer or
his consumers, are forced to bear the risks of the physical harm
from the exertion.
The Nebraska cases have not required that the employee
have merely the physical health of an average worker. They
have not required the worker to assume merely the risks of some
compensation costs are shifted is not statistically measurable. It is
probable that a part of the costs are normally shifted; but all em-
ployers, with their greatly varying costs, certainly do not escape
painless .... Workmen's compensation does not place the cost of
accidents upon industry, but provides for a sharing of the resulting
economic loss between employers and employees on a pre-determined
basis, without reference to fault, under a plan designed to insure
prompt and certain recovery, at minimum expenses. Its justification
is, not that the consumers in the end pay the bill, but that work-
men's compensation reduces the economic loss resulting from indus-
trial accidents to a minimum. This is the principle of 'the least
social cost,' a phrase coined by the late E. H. Downey in his book
on workmen's compensation-the philosophy of eliminating indus-
trial waste, which President Hoover and his fellow engineers have
made familiar in recent years."
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sort of a mythical employment. The practical effect of the
9usual exertion" rules has been to require the employees to as-
sume the risks of internal body injury from virtually anything
they may be doing for their employers. No Nebraska decision
since Dymak in 1937 has allowed recovery for any form of ex-
ertion or strain, however "extraordinary," without some addi-
tional facts also being set out in the opinion showing an impact
or slipping.
Under these cases, exertion is considered to be ordinary even
though the employee has told his employer the work was too
much for him, and has never done the specific type of work be-
fore 1 8 even though the employee faced "emergency" circum-
stances if he was hired, in part, to face emergencies, 1 9 and per-
haps even though there are slight physical impacts if the impacts
are so numerous and frequent as not to be unexpected and un-
foreseen. 120  Pursuing this reasoning to its extreme, an employer
would not be liable for compensation for forcing an employee
to do work which the employer knew would cause harm to the
employee, if that work were part of the employee's ordinary
duties.
121
Perhaps the most extreme example of requiring an employee
to assume the risks of his employment is Eschenbrenner v. Em-
ployers Mut. Cas. Co.' 22 This case recites a situation in which
a police chief dramatically captured an armed insane man, but
was denied compensation for a heart attack, which the court
seemed tacitly to assume was caused by the struggle, because
police chiefs in small Nebraska cities are supposed to capture
insane people. The chief tried to persuade the man to surrender
himself or to release children whom he was holding as hostages,
was confronted with a gun held to his stomach by the insane
118 Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equip. Co., 172 Neb. 197, 109 N.W.2d 111
(1961).
119 Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 165 Neb. 32, 84 N.W.2d
169 (1957); Brown v. City of Omaha, 141 Neb. 587, 4 N.W.2d 564
(1942). The overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdic-
tions allows recovery in this situation. See Horovitz, Workmen's
Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NFB. L.
REv. 1, 9 (1961).
120 Murray v. National Gypsum Co., 160 Neb. 463, 70 N.W.2d 394 (1955).
121 Cf. Gamble v. Gamble, 171 Neb. 826, 108 N.W.2d 92 (1961) (em-
ployee assumed risks of riding horse over rough, icy terrain to
which his employer, a ranch owner not covered by workmen's com-
pensation, had negligently exposed him after his objection to at-
tempting the work because of the dangerous conditions).
122 165 Neb. 32, 84 N.W.2d 169 (1957).
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man, was released, engaged in a two hour battle in which shots
were fired, tried to kick in a door, crashed in a window through
which tear gas was shot into the house, breathed some of the
tear gas, helped rescue the children held as hostages, got the
draw on the insane man as he left the house, and disarmed and
subdued the man. He then walked to a shed, vomited, slumped
to the ground and died several hours later of a heart attack.
The court, in applying the ordinary exertion rule, stated:
123
That was the type of job he had. On occasion emotional stress
and strain and physical exertion are involved in such a job....
While admiration should be extended to this efficient officer,
we find nothing in the evidence to disclose that he was perform-
ing any duties other than those which he would ordinarily be
obligated to perform as chief of police of the city of Crawford.
Unfortunately, Mr. Eschenbrenner had missed being shot by a
bullet, had missed other injury by external means in the fray,
and had missed any slip, trip or fall in his office in city hall.
C. The court's granting of recovery in "extraordinary" ex-
ertion cases seems premised upon the assumption that whatever
is unusual is, therefore, an "unexpected or unforeseen event."
It would appear, however, that Mr. Knaggs' heart attack was
much less an unexpected and unforeseen event from pushing a
1,500 pound deep freeze than it would have been from pushing
a 500 pound refrigerator or a 300 pound oxygen tank. Yet, there
is an indication that Mr. Knaggs would not have been allowed
compensation for strain from the latter items alone.
If it is the pushing which must be unexpected or unforeseen,
then why was it unexpected or unforeseen that Mr. Knaggs
would have to push the equipment in order to paint the floor?
Would he also have been involved in unusual overexertion if he
had pushed the deep freeze twice before?-or five, eight or ten
times? The mere fact that Mr. Knaggs had to push the deep
freeze for the first time was apparently not controlling. Mr.
Hladky had never before run an air hammer riveting gun, but
he was denied compensation on the basis that this was part
of his ordinary duties.
What the court was really saying was probably that having
to push 1,500 pounds was simply more than Mr. Knaggs was em-
ployed to do. This means that the court must first determine
in these cases what the assumption of risk level is for the em-
ployee involved. Mr. Knaggs, it would appear, had to assume
the risk of a heart attack from pushing the 500 pound refriger-
123 Id. at 48-49, 84 N.W.2d at 178.
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ator, but not the 1,500 pound deep freeze. His employer could,
however, have raised the assumption of risk level to 1,500 pounds
by requiring Mr. Knaggs to move the 1,500 pound deep freeze
more often.
This rule forces the courts to make an impossible decision
concerning whether a specific act involves more or less exertion
than the amount of exertion normally required of the employee.
For example, in Anderson, the court was concerned, in part,
whether walking through knee-deep snow involved greater exer-
tion than stacking 100 pound sacks.1 2 4  Conceivably, the answer
would be different depending upon whether Mr. Anderson had
strained his back, intestines, a vessel in his eye, or the vessels
of his heart.
D. The current Nebraska decisions unfairly, and without
statutory direction, discriminate against employees whose ordi-
nary work causes physical injuries by strain or exertion. The
determination is one of coverage. As a result, employees who
are injured from work-connected strain in performing ordinary
duties are denied any recovery for medical bills or temporary or
permanent disability. These workers must either pay the bills
and sustain the losses of disability or, along with their families
and dependents, rely upon some form of charity.
125
Workers injured by external causes, however slight, receive
the full benefits of the compensation law. Employees with ven-
124 Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 777, 65 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1954).
125 See Hayes v. McMullen, 128 Neb. 432, 435, 259 N.W. 165, 167 (1935)
(holding that snow blindness manifesting itself over a several hour
period was a compensable accident): "It can hardly be doubted
that the legislature had in mind, among other things, the protection
of persons gainfully and honorably employed and who had received
injuries in the course of their employment through no fault of their
own, but could receive no compensation under common-law rules
and who would be in danger of becoming public charges. They had
in mind the placing of the burden upon the particular industry in-
volved, rather than upon the public." The court in Westcoatt v.
Lilley, 134 Neb. 376, 379, 278 N.W. 854, 856 (1938) stated: "This
aim [to shift from the employee to modem industry the burden of
economic waste or loss] includes a purpose to prevent an employee's
dependents from becoming a public charge." The court in Parson
v. Murphy, 101 Neb. 542, 545, 163 N.W. 847, 848 (1917) stated: "The
act is one of general interest, not only to the workman and his
employer, but as well to the state, and it should be so construed that
technical refinements of interpretation will not be permitted to
defeat it. Among its objects are these: That the cost of the injury
may be charged to the industry in which it occurs; the prevention
of tedious and costly litigation; a speedy settlement between em-
ployer and employee; and to prevent dependent persons from be-
coming a public burden."
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ereal diseases may recover full benefits for slight scrapes which
would not affect a normally healthy individual. A worker who
stupidly trips or falls and is injured will recover full benefits
for his entire resulting disability, regardless of underlying condi-
tions of extreme physical or mental infirmity. These external
cause and slipping rules reflect the basic objective of workmen's
compensation to impose as a cost of production compensation
for whatever injuries the production has in fact caused to the
workmen. Employers and consumers must take the workmen as
they are, and pay compensation for work-connected injuries.
126
Compensation is expected to be granted to healthy and unhealthy
workmen, to careful and absent minded workmen, to employees
of hazardous and nonhazardous occupations, to the strong and the
weak, and for foreseeable and unforeseeable causes.
The ordinary exertion rules, however, draw a line between
injuries caused by external means and those caused by internal
body failure. A warehouseman who suffers a strained back,
hernia, ruptured blood vessel, heart attack, or other injury from
stacking 200 pound cartons would presumably be denied com-
pensation. If the same employee, through inattention to his
work or other carelessness, drops the carton or lets it slip, and
then suffers the same injury, he will be granted full compensa-
tion benefits. In other words, the Nebraska decisions would deny
compensation to the employee perfectly performing his duties,
but grant compensation to one who manages somehow to mis-
perform and injuries himself by slipping or falling.
Suppose that the same employee lifting a 200 pound carton
drops the carton or lets it slip because of a hangover (not suf-
ficient to constitute "intoxication"' 27 ) or because of a pre-exist-
ing arthritic condition in his hands or arms. Again, there is a
126 See, e.g., Tucker v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 10, 43 N.W.
2d 522, 527 (1950): "It is true that the evidence shows plaintiff
was not a strong and robust person. In truth it shows that he had
physical afflictions from which it is easy to say that he was a person
readily susceptible to disease and injury but this condition consti-
tutes no bar to a right of recovery for accidental injury under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. He has the right to have his award
sustained if he has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
he sustained an injury, resulting from an accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment even if preexisting disability
combined to produce his disability."
127 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-109, -151(7) (c) (Reissue 1960). An em-
ployer is not liable for compensation for accidents caused by, or
resulting in any degree from, the employee's intoxication at the time
of the injury, such intoxication being without the consent, knowl-
edge )r acquiescence of the employer or the employer's agent.
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slipping and compensation. Recovery would be denied to the
employee with only a bad back, intestine, vessel, or heart, but
granted to the same employee with an additional hangover or
arthritis. Similarly, recovery would be denied to the warehouse-
man for strain in lifting the 200 pound cartons, but granted to
an office employee required under unusual circumstances to move
a desk or equipment of considerably lesser weight.
There is no statutory language compelling this distinction.
Certainly, no social policy justifies this result. Mr. Brown, the
fireman, certainly should not be denied compensation for breath-
ing fumes and fighting a fire for several hours, but granted
compensation merely because he absent-mindedly trips over a
fire hose outside the building. 12  Mr. Eschenbrenner, the police
chief, was denied compensation for injuries from his heroics in
subduing an armed insane man. Mr. Eschenbrenner would un-
doubtedly have been entitled to compensation had he slipped in
answering the telephone call in his office which reported the
occurrence, and he would have been entitled to compensation
had he slipped, tripped or fallen on his way to the men's room
in city hall. Yet, just as surely as that slip had caused him per-
sonal injury, his exertion of apprehending the insane man caused
his death. Mr. Anderson was more fortunate because he was
normally required to engage in a considerably lesser degree of
exertion as a traveling salesman, and the exertion from which
he was injured occurred during a snowstorm.
E. The cases involving aggravation by an external event
make it clear that a basic purpose of the workmen's compensa-
tion statute is to pay benefits for work caused disability regard-
less of an employee's underlying physical infirmities. The com-
pensation statute generally imposes a considerably broader lia-
bility upon the economic product of an employer than the nor-
mal tort liability of third parties. The purpose of spreading
workmen's compensation costs among a large segment of the
128 Mr. Brown might be entitled to some benefits for injuries by exer-
tion or strain under the firemen's pension system of the Omaha
home rule charter or state law with respect to Lincoln and cities
of the first class. Workmen's compensation disability benefits, if
paid, would be deducted from the amount of the pensions payable
under state law. The pension system, however, does not pay any
medical benefits. Also, it covers only death, permanent and total
disability, and temporary-total disability up to twelve months. Mr.
Eschenbrenner, the policeman, might be entitled to benefits com-
parable to the firemen's pension, but only if he were employed in
Omaha or Lincoln.
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consuming public as a cost of protection justifies the broader
coverage.
12 9
The Nebraska decisions are unique and anomalous in this
regard. Both tort law and workmen's compensation involve bor-
derline situations where the injuried party has some latent in-
firmity which may be set off in a variety of ways. Not all ag-
gravation cases fall into the category where a slight occurrence
sets off a disasterous chain reaction, but some do. In these
cases, the third party or the employer just happens to be at the
wrong place at the wrong time and becomes the one to activate
the underlying infirmity. As a matter of fact, the third party
or the employment has caused the resulting harm, assuming that
the burden of causal proof of activation is sustained. The in-
jured person might never have suffered from the disability which
he in fact sustained from the occurrence. Certainly, he would
not have been injured at that time and in that manner. In the
sense that death is inevitable, nothing unexpected has occurred,
but the third party or the employment has in fact brought about
the death or injury at least sooner than it would otherwise have
occurred.
Some courts have been unwilling to extend tort liability to
cover these extreme circumstances. 30 This has been done by a
judicial limitation of the rules of duty and proximate cause. But
in the famous "poison bran" case,131 the Nebraska Supreme Court
handed down one of the most "liberal" tort interpretations of
any court in the United States. The Nebraska court gave a re-
covery for the death of a purchaser of poison bran who fed the
bran to his dairy herd and other animals. The purchaser died
from a "decompensated heart caused by emotional disturbance"
resulting in large part from an unreasonable fear that dairy
customers would be harmed by drinking milk from the poisoned
cows. Judge Carter, in a dissenting opinion joined in by Judge
Eberly, felt that the death was not proximately caused by the
negligent sale of the sack of poison bran, nor a foreseeable con-
129 At most, tort liability places costs upon individual persons or busi-
nesses who must pass off or bear those costs within a competitive
system. Through compulsory insurance, the workmen's compensa-
tion system imposes the risks of employee injuries upon all em-
ployers. The workmen's compensation expenses are more likely
to be passed off by all employers having comparable costs in this
regard because to this extent there is no competitive disadvantage
in a price increase.
130 See note 73 supra.
131 Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937), rehearing
denied, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938), noted in 18 NEB. L. BULL.
331 (1939).
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sequence thereof; that the emotional upset was not caused by a
fear of physical peril to himself or his own property; and that
the seller of bran owed no duty to the buyer for this sort of
mental distress.
18 2
Judge Carter's view has tended to prevail in the compensa-
tion area, however, where aggravation of infirmities by exertion
or strain is involved. As a matter of causation, the poison bran
case had held that no "impact" was necessary for recovery for
negligently inflicted mental injuries. Yet, in a compensation case,
Judge Carter wrote the majority opinion which denied compen-
sation for emotional injuries to an elevator operator trapped for
thirty minutes with a dying man who was being squashed to
death between floors.133 The majority opinion treated the ele-
vator operator's mental breakdown as an "accident," but held
that there was no "injury," as that term is defined, because
there was no "violence to the physical structure of the body."
As a result, Nebraska tort law does not require "impact," but
the compensation statute, even with its liberal interpretation,
requires something akin to an impact.
Judge Carter dissented in the Schirmer case, where the em-
ployee slipped slightly on the telephone pole, on what were es-
sentially the same policy grounds as his dissent in the poison
bran case. The employer should not have been held liable for
what was at most a mere setting off of the employee's latent
heart condition. Liability should not extend to a mere trigger-
ing of underying physical disorders. An employer is not an in-
surer of the health of his employees. An employer is no more
liable for injuries which are basically the product of pre-existing
physical infirmities which occur during working hours than he
would be if the same injury had occurred during nonworking
hours. Factually, Judge Carter seems to have viewed most of
the injuries involved in past exertion cases as being of the
sort which would have been just as likely to have happened to
the employee during nonworking hours, and to have been caused
by factors other than the employment.
Judge Carter has forcefully and consistently applied the
theory that neither a third party nor an employer should be
132 Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 241, 280 N.W. 890, 894 (1938).
Judge Chappell, then a district judge sitting by designation, dissented
from the original opinion, but was not sitting at the time of the
motion for rehearing.
133 Bekelski v. 0. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942). Most
jurisdictions take a more liberal view. See Horovitz, Workmen's
Compensation: Half Centruy of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1961). See note 73 supra.
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liable for a mere activation of a pre-existing infirmity where the
resulting injury seems to be much more the product of the in-
firmity than of any conduct by the third party or employer. He
dissented in the poison bran tort case. He dissented in the work-
men's compensation case involving only a slight slipping. 3 4  He
concurred in a separate opinion on this basis in the principal
compensation case denying compensation for aggravation by ex-
ertion or strain in performing ordinary duties.
135
The result is that a majority of the court would generally
impose liability for aggravation of pre-existing infirmities in
both the tort and compensation cases regardless of the underly-
ing nature of the infirmity. The compensation cases permit re-
covery for the total resulting disability where there is an exter-
nal event or slipping, however slight. But the compensation
cases are more restrictive than the poison bran case in denying
compensation for aggravation of pre-existing infirmities by ex-
ertion or strain.
F. The problem of medical proof in aggravation cases gen-
erally is extremely difficult. At best, reliable medical testimony
is normally only that it is "reasonably probable" that a certain
work or trauma caused a certain injury. In many areas, there
are medical controversies among recognized authorities as to
the relationship between trauma or exertion and the incidence
of an injury. The compensation claimant has a burden of show-
ing the causal relation between the work and the injury, and
this proof cannot rest upon mere "possibilities."
In a large number of compensation cases, the court has held
that a specific injury to a specific employee was not shown by
the compensation claimant to have arisen out of and in the course
of employment." 6 An employee should not be entitled to com-
134 See note 72 supra.
135 See note 74 supra.
136 Gotfrey v. Sakurada, 169 Neb. 879, 101 N.W.2d 470 (1960); Nelson v.
Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation Dist., 168 Neb. 37, 95 N.W.2d 201
(1959); Wynia v. Hoesing, 167 Neb. 136, 91 N.W.2d 404 (1958);
McCauley v. Harris, 164 Neb. 216, 82 N.W.2d 30 (1957); Cole v.
Cushman Motor Works, 159 Neb. 97, 65 N.W.2d 330 (1954); Ruder-
man v. Forman Bros., 157 Neb. 605, 60 N.W.2d 658 (1953); Seger
v. Keating Implement Co., 157 Neb. 560, 60 N.W.2d 598 (1953);
Miller v. Livestock Buying Co., 157 Neb. 51, 58 N.W.2d 596 (1953);
Hahl v. Heyne, 156 Neb. 599, 57 N.W.2d 137 (1953); McCoy v. Gooch
Milling & Elevator Co., 156 Neb. 95, 54 N.W.2d 373 (1952); Rahfeldt
v. Swanson, 155 Neb. 482, 52 N.W.2d 261 (1952); Beam v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 152 Neb. 663, 42 N.W.2d 293 (1950); Meester v.
Schultz, 151 Neb. 614, 38 N.W.2d 739 (1949); Hassmann v. City of
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pensation for head injury where he cannot establish by admissible
evidence, as he has claimed, that he was struck by a shovel.1
3 7
Similarly, an employee should not be entitled to compensation
for a heart attack'38 or back sprain' 3 9 where there is no evidence
that the employment did in fact cause the injury. Also, in the
exertion cases, the statutory definition of the terms "injury"
and "personal injury" states that they "shall not be construed to
include disability or death due to natural causes but occurring
while the employee is at work. '
' 40
This burden of proof of showing employment-cause serves
a useful purpose in the compensation system and should not be
relaxed. The theory is that the employer and his product should
bear the costs of injuries caused by the employment. In general,
compensation is a substitute for tort liability and not health in-
surance in which an employer becomes a general insurer of the
health of his workmen. Compensation is not intended to pay for
the mere wearing out of the body of the employee. The physical
wearing out is normally assumed to be paid for by wages. Any
pensioning of superannuated or worn out workmen is left to be
handled, if at all, as a separate social problem under the social
security law and programs for the relief of needy persons. But
having sustained a factual burden of establishing that the em-
ployment did cause a disability, or aggravate a pre-existing in-
firmity to a point of disability, the claimant should be entitled
to compensation. As to that, the employment has been shown
to have caused an injury to the employee which would not
have occurred, at least at that time, place and form, were it not
for the employment.
The current Nebraska exertion decisions have tended to in-
termix the accident requirement with issues of "arising out of
Bloomfield, 146 Neb. 608, 20 N.W.2d 592 (1945); Williams v. Watson
Bros. Transfer Co., 145 Neb. 466, 16 N.W.2d 199 (1945); Hammond
v. Doctor's Hosp., 145 Neb. 446, 17 N.W.2d 9 (1945); Chambers v.
Bilhorn, Bower & Peters, Inc., 145 Neb. 277, 16 N.W.2d 173 (1944);
Pixa v. Grainger Bros., 143 Neb. 922, 12 N.W.2d 74 (1943); Zanski
v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 143 Neb. 340, 9 N.W.2d 302 (1943);
Mook v. City of Lincoln, 143 Neb. 254, 9 N.W.2d 184 (1943); Kaffen-
berger v. Iverson, 142 Neb. 257, 5 N.W.2d 687 (1942); Nollett v. Hol-
land Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 538, 4 N.W.2d 554 (1942).
'37 Haufe v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 163 Neb. 329, 79 N.W.2d
570 (1956).
138 See, e.g., Duncan v. Weidman, 143 Neb. 846, 11 N.W.2d 537 (1943).
139 See, e.g., Ramsey v. Kramer Motors, Inc., 155 Neb. 584, 52 N.W.2d
799 (1952).
140 NE. REv. STAT. § 48-151(4) (Reissue 1960).
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and in the course of employment." 14 1 Most of the exertion cases
have discussed factual issues that the employment was not shown
to have caused the resulting injury. Had the decisions stopped
at this point, there could not be justifiable criticism. The su-
preme court, in a trial de novo upon the record, makes a final
determination whether the specific injury to the employee in-
volved was caused in fact by that employee's work.
142
Most of the supreme court's decisions have not rested solely
upon a holding that the work did not in fact cause the injury.
They have virtually all gone on to state that even if the work
did cause the injury, the injury was the product of "mere exer-
tion, which is not greater than that ordinarily incident to the
employment." This shifts the issue from "arising out of and
in the course of employment" to "by accident." The appearance
of the opinions is that the court is attempting to resolve by rule
of law a group of cases in which the factual issues of causation
and medical proof are extremely difficult. Most strain cases have
not been decided exclusively upon either the issue of causal
relationship or the ordinary exertion rules, although there are
exceptions. To this degree, the opinions would appear to be
using the ordinary exertion rules to avoid a definitive categoriza-
tion of the cause in fact issues. It is submitted that the critical
question is, and should be, solely whether the employment in-
volved did in fact cause injury by exertion or strain.
One aspect of tending to intermix the questions of causation
and accident is that the court has not given a liberal construction
to the statutory accident requirement. The rule is that a court
should give a liberal construction to the workmen's compensation
statute, but not to the questions of fact arising under the law.
1 43
In deciding the factual issues of whether or not the employment
caused the resulting injury, no liberal interpretation should be
applied to the evidence under Nebraska law. But the determina-
tion of whether or not the employee sustained an accident under
the statutory definition would appear to be one of law to which
a liberal construction should be given. In no way does it require
a liberal interpretation of the evidence to permit compensation
for routine exertion. It is the statutory language which should
be construed liberally to carry out its originally intended and
plain meaning.
141 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960).
142 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-165 (Reissue 1960).
143 See note 102 supra.
AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING INFIRMITIES 143
G. Cases involving injury by exertion may present factual
issues of causation which are extremely difficult to resolve. The
charges run as follows:
(1) The testimony concerning cause in fact in many cases
may be that of the injured person alone. To a degree, the
presence of an external event or of a slipping serves as corrobora-
tion that the employee was injured at a definite time, place and
from a specific cause. The absence of an unexpected external
event could make it difficult for witnesses or the parties to re-
member significant facts concerning the cause of injury.
(2) Employers have difficulty in properly defending claims
unless they have some notice at the time of a specific event to
gather and preserve reliable evidence. In the slipping cases, an
employer must establish basically that a particular slipping did
not cause the alleged injury. In exertion cases, he may have a
broader practical obligation of having to show that the injury
did not arise from any work duties.
(3) Exertion cases are more likely to rest on matters of
personal opinion as to causation than the objective facts of an
external event or slipping. Impartial witnesses may serve to
verify the slipping whereas an exertion case is primarily a battle
of experts called to testify on behalf of the interested parties-
not only as to the cause of the injury, but, in some cases, to the
validity or existence of the alleged cause itself.
(4) Granting recoveries for injuries caused by exertion
might cause false testimony as to causation or malingering as
to duration.
The current Nebraska rules denying recovery for ordinary
exertion are, admittedly, mechanical rules of easy application.
It is possible to dispose of the case by application of the mechan-
ical rule of law and avoid a resolution of complex issues of
causation.14 4  This argument simply states that it is more ex-
pedient to deny compensation to some deserving claimants than
to resolve a larger number of possibly difficult cases. In the
process, compensation is denied to some claimants whose cases
are not the least bit difficult.
144 See, e.g., Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equip. Co., 172 Neb. 197, 203, 109
N.W.2d 111, 114-15 (1961): "We do not think it is necessary for
this court to decide which theory was correct. Whichever was true
his condition was not caused by an accident within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Neither was it caused by exertion
which was greater than that ordinarily incident to the employment.
Even if such ordinary exertion combined with a pre-existing disease
produced disability, it is not under that act compensable."
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Essentially, the issues in the "run-of-the-mill" exertion cases
are no more impossible of legal and medical proof than most
other types of cases involving aggravation of pre-existing infirmi-
ties. The court has held that what is ordinary exertion for an
employee may cause him injury. The Nebraska court has held
that specific injuries may be shown by competent evidence to
have been caused by exertion, even heart attacks which may be
the most difficult injury to prove medically. These decisions
indicate that ordinary exertion from some employments, without
any slipping, could cause a heart attack,145 strained back,
146
strained abdominal muscles, 147 a paralytic stroke1 48 or hemor-
rhage 1 49 from ruptured blood vessels.
The exertion cases have their own background of corrobora-
tive evidence. Employers generally supervise their employees,
and fellow employees are in a position to observe the conduct of
the work accomplished, and, to a degree, some symptoms of the
physical health of other employees. A number of exertion cases
will tie the injury specifically and directly to definite exertion,
having as precise a location as to time, place, and causation as
cases involving an external event or slipping. 150 Many external
event or slipping cases arise in settings which are considerably
less than conclusive on the issues of causation, and the court re-
solves these cases under accepted rules of burden of proof and
fact determination.
The testimony in some of the external violence or slipping
cases consists primarily of the evidence of the injured party alone.
Unwitnessed slippings occur, and witnessed strains occur. There
is no reason why the burden of proof, or the giving of notice to
the employer, should be different in an exertion case than is
145 Knaggs v. City of Lexington, 171 Neb. 135, 105 N.W.2d 727 (1960);
Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
146 Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958);
Gilbert v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770
(1953); Tucker v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 43 N.W.2d
522 (1950); Dymak v. Haskins Bros., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860
(1937).
147 Derr v. Kirkpatrick, 106 Neb. 403, 184 N.W. 91 (1921).
148 Manning v. Pomerene, 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917).
149 Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930).
15o See, e.g., Feagins v. Carver, 162 Neb. 116, 75 N.W.2d 379 (1956);
Jones v. Yankee Hill Brick Mfg. Co., 161 Neb. 404, 73 N.W.2d 394
(1955); Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 165 Neb. 32, 84
N.W.2d 169 (1957); Manning v. Pomerene, 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W.
492 (1917).
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now required in the external injury or slipping cases. In either
case, recovery means only that those employees who can estab-
lish work-caused injuries are entitled to compensation. Essen-
tially the same types of witnesses concerning factual and medical
causation are available in either case. The latent injury rules
today call upon employers to defend some cases where there
has not been notice at the time of the operative facts, and require
an employee to sustain a burden of proof with respect to a period
of time in which he may not have known he was injured.
There is no more reason to assume that an employee would
be in a better position to present false claims of ordinary strain
than is now offered him to supply the magical words of "slip,
trip or fall." The argument essentially is that no claims for in-
juries from exertion should be allowed because these claims are
difficult to decide and false claims may be presented. Thus, the
argument goes, even legitimate and proven claims should be
denied. Especially in the light of the realistic purposes of work-
men's compensation, it would seem desirable to provide compen-
sation for those claimants who can establish a work-caused in-
jury, and, if the system needs protection against false claims, to
devote further attention to those matters as that need demands.
H. There is a possibility that relaxing the ordinary exertion
bar to workmen's compensation could cause an unwarranted
number of new claims to be filed on behalf of any worker injured
at work or at any time remotely related to his having performed
work. The argument is that there would be a strong incentive
for every worker to claim that every injury to him arose from
his employment. The ad hoc nature of making these factual
decisions could result in increased litigation, preventing some
workers unable to bear the expenses of litigation from any re-
covery or forcing them to make disadvantageous compromises.
An increase in litigation would defeat an objective of workmen's
compensation of making a prompt payment, and would delay
recoveries by deserving claimants.
There is no reason why permitting recovery to workers in-
jured by the strain of ordinary work should interfere with re-
covery of compensation by other employees who are now entitled
to recover for injuries caused by an external event or slipping.
Also, there need not be an unwarranted number of claims or
increased litigation if the court does not relax the burden of
proof requirements. Eliminating the ordinary exertion bar
merely means that those deserving employees who can establish
by admissible evidence that their work did in fact cause them
an injury will be paid compensation. Not one of the overwhelm-
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ing majority of states allowing recovery for routine exertion
has amended its statutes to deny such compensation. And
the reported decisions in the increasing number of states which
have switched from the strict Nebraska rule to a more liberal
rule do not reflect a substantial long run increase in litigation.
I. An abandonment of the ordinary exertion rules would
undoubtedly add costs to the over-all compensation program.
Compensation would be payable to workers who now must pay
for their own work-caused injuries, themselves, or rely upon
some form of charity. It does not seem unjust to add these costs
of work-connected injuries to the costs of doing business. Theo-
retically, these added costs of production could not be passed off
by Nebraska employers through an increase in the prices of
their goods because of the competition by employers in other
states. As a practical matter, the increase in rates, if any, would
undoubtedly be negligible in terms of total production costs. Ne-
braska producers do not now operate at an ascertainable advan-
tage over Iowa and Minnesota employers where there is no ac-
cident requirement at all.151 And Nebraska producers were not
at a competitive disadvantage for the twenty or more years in
which compensation was payable in Nebraska for routine exer-
tion. On the strictly theoretical plane, even if there were an
added cost of goods to consumers because of personal injuries
caused by the production of these goods, it would seem to be
more socially desirable to sustain the slight increase in the over-
all cost of consumer goods than to force the burden upon the
individual employee whose work has caused him harm, and the
family and dependents of the worker. In an economic sense, it
is more desirable to provide some form of employment insurance
paid for by the consumers of the product than to redress work-
caused injuries to destitute workers, and their dependents and
families, through outright charity and other accepted welfare
systems.
151 Many items, of course, affect the cost of workmen's compensation
insurance. For example, Nebraska and Minnesota provide full medi-
cal benefits, but Iowa does not. Nebraska (49%) lags behind Minne-
sota (54%) and Iowa (55%) on the ratio of maximum weekly dis-
ability benefits to average weekly wages in the state. It is under-
stood that commercial insurance companies wrote $8,056,344.00 in
direct premiums in 1959 in Nebraska, and sustained direct losses of
$4,166,964.00. Since then, medical costs have gone up and insurance
rates have been increased. It would seem that an increase in work-
men's compensation rates from covering ordinary exertion would
provide increased revenues for commercial companies writing work-
men's compensation insurance through the increase in dollar volume
of the expense loading factor.
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J. From the standpoint of social policy, it is also more de-
sirable to prevent injuries than to redress them after they occur.
It is better to have people working and healthy than injured and
compensated. One of the objectives of workmen's compensation
is to encourage employers to guard against physical injuries to
employees by providing safe places to work and maintaining ef-
fective supervision. This is carried out through premium reduc-
tions for past favorable experience and by surveillance by in-
surance companies.
It would seem that employers could be expected to take
some similar steps to guard against purely internal physical in-
juries caused by the work. Physical examinations may be used
as safety inspections and supervision maintained as to the proper
performance of duties. The employer and the consumer of the
employer's product should bear the costs of protecting against
work-caused internal injuries to the same extent as is now done
in the case of the violent external injuries. As it now stands,
employers in really strenuous occupations would theoretically
need to use little caution in selecting physically fit employees
for difficult jobs, because the employees, themselves, would as-
sume all of the risks of internal body failure from the strain of
performing the most demanding types of work.
If employers really do try to guard against the risks of in-
ternal physical breakdown of the employee, then, also theoretical-
ly, elderly, handicapped, obese, and otherwise impaired persons,
and even persons with comparatively minor physical limitations,
would find their employment opportunities severly limited.1Y 2
Today, however, employers must pay full compensation to these
people for work-connected injury in virtually every way other
than by strain. This includes full compensation for any aggrava-
tion "by accident" of any pre-existing infirmity. These categories
of persons may now find their employment opportunities limited,
and in part, because of a feared increased risk of physical harm.'5 3
152 See I LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 567 (1952): "[I]t
will not be surprising to find employers imposing stiffer physical
qualifications and refusing to hire men with any kind of heart
history or symptoms."
153 These factors have been present since the beginnings of workmen's
compensation. See Walton, Workmen's Compensation and The
Theory of Professional Risk, 11 CoLum. L. REV. 36, 45 (1911): "Ex-
perience in both France and England goes to show that the Work-
men's Compensation Acts greatly prejudice the chances of employ-
ment of workmen whose health is unsound or who are subject to
any partial incapacity .... Similar considerations apply to old
men or those who have a tendency to disease. The employer has
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To the extent this fear is justified, it would seem socially desir-
able to deter these persons from jobs which may be quite danger-
ous to them into other lines of endeavor. In a free labor market,
the acceptance of employment by these persons in jobs which
are hazardous to them theoretically results in an acceptance by
them of a lower wage scale and forces them to assume the risks
of internal body injury. Theoretically, the free market would
adjust the wage scale for compensation benefit increases, if any,
resulting from the employment of impaired workers rather than
healthy workers. And the compensation system generally has
reduced assumption of employment risks by employees.
The real answer to these questions lies not in depriving all
workers of compensation for exertion. Employees should be
entitled to compensation for those injuries which their work has
caused them. The answer for the seriously impaired or disabled
individuals would appear to be in a realistic revamping of the
basic concepts of the operation of an adequate second injury
fund mechanism'5 4 and taking more effective action concerning
rehabilitation and re-employment of impaired workers. At pre-
sent, the compensation owed to a disabled worker who suffers
additional injury is not clear; the second injury fund mechanism
is woefully deficient; there is no rehabilitation program what-
soever under the compensation system, and the efforts at retrain-
ing and re-employment, although sincere, are left to agencies out-
side the compensation system and are not as effective as they
might be. It is simply not fair to use these deficiencies in the
overall compensation scheme to deny compensation to the many
employees whose work has in fact caused them injury by strain
or exertion.
every inducement to employ as far as possible only young and ro-
bust workmen. The Poor Law Report of 1909 in England lays con-
siderable weight on this as one of the causes of pauperism. Unless
the labor unions allow elderly men, or men suffering from some
infirmity or tendency to disease, to be employed at less than the
fixed minimum rate of wages, there is ground to fear lest the Work-
men's Compensation Acts, intended to be remedial, should be ser-
iously prejudicial to the interests of such workmen."
254 It would seem that the second injury fund might be designed to
cover employees with any known physical impairment, whether or
not disabling. Employers would be encouraged to inspect the health
of workers. Upon proper notice to and verification by the fund,
the fund, would share the compensation obligation with the em-
ployer. But cf. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 567
(1952): "It is far from clear, however, that any such device can
be adapted to the present problem, in which the pre-existing condi-
tion is apt to be quite vague, and in which the ultimate result is
usually the indivisible disaster of death."
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VII. CONCLUSION
The current Nebraska decisions denying workmen's compen-
sation for work-caused injuries to employees merely because the
injuries are the product of ordinary exertion or strain are directly
contrary to the intended meaning of the compensation statute
and to fundamental concepts of workmen's compensation. These
rules should be changed forthwith by judicial decision or legis-
lative revision or both.
The ordinary exertion rules have had an adult life of twenty
years in Nebraska, following an infancy of seven years. During
the last twenty years, there has been no disagreement among
members of the court as to the statement or meaning of the
rules, and no legislative change of the rules.155 It may be con-
tended that stare decisis plus legislative acquiescence should now
preclude any change in the judicial position of the Nebraska
Supreme Court.
But stare decisis and legislative acquiescence did not preclude
the adoption of the present rules by the court following a simi-
lar period under the opposite rules. For the first twenty years
under the compensation statute, the Nebraska Supreme Court
had, without exception, held that the statute contemplated an
unexpected or unforeseen injury, whether the injury resulted
from strain in the performance of the employee's ordinary duties
or from an external occurrence or a slip, trip or fall. The over-
whelming majority of states allow compensation for injuries
caused by strain from doing routine work. The courts of
Arizona,' 50 Arkansas, 15 Florida, 15 and Michigan'5" have aban-
155 There has been at least one unsuccessful legislative attempt to
eliminate the entire accident requirement. L.B. 715, 72nd Neb. Leg.
Sess. (1961).
156 In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz. 436, 150 P.2d 355 (1944), overruling Pierce
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017 (1933).
'57 Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436
(1956).
158 Gray v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1952).
159 Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957); Sheppard
v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 598-99, 83 N.W.2d 614, 623
(1957): "To those who fear the unsettling effect of overruling
precedent, it should be noted that certainty in the law is impeded,
not aided, by a court's ostensible adherence to stare decisis, while
avoiding the effect thereof through the process of distinguishing
cases on trivial fact differentiations, which, having served their
purpose in one case, are abandoned in the next. In short, the doc-
trine of stare decisis is beneficial and desirable but it should neither
be used as a crutch, substituting the majesty of its authority for the
drudgery of research and exposition, nor as a cyclone cellar in
which we of the court can find ready refuge from the hurricane
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doned the ordinary exertion rules by judicial decisions on the
theory of inherent judicial power to apply the correct rule of
law to the case at bar in spite of what may have been misappli-
cations of the rule in the past. 6 0
Although it would not be the only method, the simplest
method of legislative correction of the present serious inequity
would be merely to add the words "or result" following "unex-
pected or unforeseen event" in the statutory definition of "acci-
dent."'16 1 The current judicial decisions have, for practical pur-
poses, added the word "external" before "event," contrary to
what was thought and held to be the original intention in the
use of the phrase "unexpected or unforeseen event." The addi-
tion of these two words, "'or result," can clarify definitively
what has become an unfair deprivation of compensation to de-
serving workers for injuries which have in fact been caused
them by their employment.
born of our own mistakes. Stare decisis, then, upon both reason
and authority, offers no obstacle to our judicial corrections of our
past error. Has our error, however, been ratified by the legislature?
... In shortest terms, bluntly put, the argument is that silence
gives consent. It is suggested that we accord this catch phrase the
dignity of a legal axiom .... There is not a shred of justification
therefor under these circumstances. Silence at best is ambiguous."
160 At least one state has refused to change its usual exertion rules
judicially. See Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 280-81,
98 S.E.2d 289, 293-94 (1957): "We are aware that the interpretation
given to our statute does not harmonize with the interpretation
given by a majority of the courts to the compensation statutes of
their States .... If the question was now presented for the first
time, we would feel at liberty to give more consideration to the
reasoning of the cases which reach conclusions differing from our
own, but we are not dealing with a new question. Twenty years
and more ago the Court placed its interpretation on the Act....
The interpretation so consistently given to the statute is as much
a part of the statute as if expressly written in it. We have no
right to change or ignore it. If it is to be changed, it must be done
by the Legislature, the law-making power. If, in its wisdom a
change is desirable, it can readily do so."
161 The amended section would read: "The word 'accident' as used
in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by
the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event
or result happening suddenly and violently, with or without human
fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury."
A similar amendment was enacted in Florida, although the Florida
court had repudiated the usual exertion rules the previous year in
a four to three decision. Gray v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1952); Florida Laws c. 28238, § 1 (1953). See
also, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (Page Supp. 1960) (injury
includes "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means
or accidental in character or result. . . ."); ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.002
(19) (Supp. 1959) ("An injury is accidental if the result is an
accident, whether or not due to accidental means.").
